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NOTES
COMPUTER CRIME IN VIRGINIA: A CRITICAL
EXAMINATION OF THE CRIMINAL OFFENSES IN THE
VIRGINIA COMPUTER CRIMES ACT
Thanks to the computer, "[tihe 'information revolution' that
futurists have long predicted has arrived, bringing with it the
promise of dramatic changes in the way people live and work,
perhaps even in the way they think. America will never be the
same."'
This quotation aptly describes the position that the computer
has assumed in modern society. Large "mainframe" computers
predict the weather, process checks, scrutinize tax returns, guide
intercontinental missiles,2 launch and land the space shuttle,
model the predicted behavior of a nuclear reactor in an emer-
gency,' and perform a multitude of important tasks for govern-
mental,4 educational, 5 and commercials institutions. The "personal
1. Friedrich, The Computer Moves In, TIME, Jan. 3, 1983, at 14 (Special Section: "Ma-
chine of the Year"). Friedrich declared: "Time's Man of the Year for 1982, the greatest
influence for good or evil, is not a man at all. It is a machine: the computer." Id. at 16.
2. Id. at 14.
3. Baldwin, Faster, Faster, Faster, FORBES, Oct. 24, 1983, at 189.
4. Computer use in government has grown rapidly. In 1979, the federal government oper-
ated nearly 12,000 computers. 125 CONG. REC. 1195 (1979) (statement of Donald L. Scan-
tlebury, Dir. of Fin. & Gen. Mgmt. Studies Div., GAO). By 1983, that number exceeded
15,000, with the Bureau of Census and the Department of Defense using most of the com-
puters. 129 CONG. REc. S11,448 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1983) (statement of Sen. Trible). In early
1984, the reported figures were "18,000 medium and large-scale computers at some 4,500
sites," and the General Services Administration estimated that the federal government
"could have between 250,000 and 500,000 [microcomputers] in place by 1990." 130 CONG.
Rc. S1180 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1984) (statement of Sen. Cohen).
5. One commentator reported that "American schools possess more than 100,000 com-
puters for school use and student training." Note, Computer Abuse: The Emerging Crime
and the Need for Legislation, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 73, 73 n.8 (1984).
6. According to a recent Note, "businesses rely on more than 56,000 large general purpose
computers, 213,000 smaller business computers, 570,000 minicomputers, and 2.4 million
desktop computers, with over three million computer terminals in business offices." Id. at 74
n.10.
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computer"7 has revolutionized small business, permitting even one-
man operations to compete in the marketplace.' The computer
"network" 9 has brought the world to the home, and the
microprocessor"0 has vastly improved many consumer products."
In short, the computer is ubiquitous.
Unfortunately, the computer revolution also has sired a new cat-
egory of criminal activity: computer-assisted crime.'" Some of these
7. "Personal computer" is the common name for a microcomputer, which is defined as "a
small computer (in terms of data storage) whose central processing unit is contained on
either a small circuit board or within a single integrated circuit chip." F. RHOADS & J. ED-
WARDS, LAW OFFICE GUIDE TO SMALL COMPUTERS § 1.05, at 7 (1984).
8. See Friedrich, supra note 1, at 17-18.
9. A "network" is composed of two or more remotely located computers connected by a
communications link. See infra note 27. The owner of a computer equipped with a telecom-
munication link can use any of approximately 1450 electronic user data services ranging
from "the Source, a Reader's Digest subsidiary in McLean, Va., which can provide stock
prices, airline schedules or movie reviews, to more specialized services like the American
Medical Association's AMA/NET, to real esoterica like the Hughes Rotary Rig Report."
Friedrich, supra note 1, at 17. Computer owners with similar machines or interests also form
"bulletin boards" to swap information and computer programs of interest to members or to
the general public. See Plantz, BBS Watch, PC WORLD, May 1983, at 328.
10. A microprocessor, which is a miniature central processing unit (CPU), consists of the
integrated circuitry that directs the flow of information within the computer and does the
actual computing. A Guide to Compuspeak, CONSUMER REPS., Sept. 1983, at 486-87. The
microprocessor thus is the actual "computer." The remainder of the computer system's
physical parts ("hardware") combine with the computer programs and data files
("software") to define the full capabilities of a computer system.
11. A microprocessor containing customized operating instructions "written" permanently
in its integrated circuitry, a feature known as "read-only memory" (ROM), can be installed
inside a machine to control or monitor its operation. This technological advance has permit-
ted, among other things, the increased sophistication of many household appliances, such as
microwave ovens, televisions, and digital clocks. Kindel & Teitleman, But What Do I Use It
For?, FORBES, Oct. 24, 1983, at 76, 80. One recent advertisement even touted a table saw
fitted with a microprocessor. "Just push a button on the front-mounted computerized panel
to raise or lower the blade an incredibly accurate .005 inch .... Programmable for bevel,
elevation and shutdowns." SEARS, ROEBUCK & Co., 1985 SPRING/SUMMER CATALOG 696 (1984).
12. Most commentators refer to this category of criminal activity as "computer crime."
See, e.g., S. MANDELL, COMPUTERS. DATA PROCESSING, AND THE LAW 154-71 (1984); Roddy,
The Federal Computer Systems Protection Act, 7 RUTGERS J. COMP. TECH. L. 343, 344-45
(1980); Note, A Suggested Legislative Approach to the Problem of Computer Crime, 38
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173, 1175 (1981).
One commentator has suggested "computer-assisted crime" as a more appropriate phrase
because the only crimes "which present special challenges to those involved in the preven-
tion, detection, investigation, and prosecution of white-collar crime" are those involving
actual use of a computer. J. BECKER, THE INVESTIGATION OF COMPUTER CRIME 1 (1980). This
Note adopts Becker's "computer-assisted crime" designation because it focuses solely on
crimes that involve computer use. Legislation aimed at computer-assisted criminal activity
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crimes have involved fantastic sums. For example, the Equity
Funding insurance scam reportedly involved $2 billion,13 the Se-
curity Pacific National Bank theft involved $10.2 million,14 and the
Union Dime Savings Bank embezzlement netted $1.4 million."5
These cases have fascinated the press, have intrigued the public,
and have worried law enforcement officials and legislators alike.
Equally disturbing has been the 1973 Stanford Research Institute
(SRI) study,'6 which estimated that the annual worldwide loss
from computer abuse was $300 million, and that the average take
was $450,000.'1 The SRI study revealed not only a generally higher
per incident loss rate for computer-assisted crimes than for other
white collar crimes, but also that the losses for each type of com-
puter-assisted crime might be greater than those for the equivalent
crime accomplished without a computer. 8 During the 1970's, law
should ignore acts in which the computer is only the object of the crime, such as sabotage or
other physical assaults. These crimes are covered adequately by vandalism, malicious mis-
chief, and sabotage statutes, and do not pose problems for prosecutors. Gemignani, Com-
puter Crime: The Law in '80, 13 IND. L. REv. 681, 682 (1980); Taber, On Computer Crime
(Senate Bill S. 240), 1 CoMP. L.J. 517, 525 (1979). See generally T. WHITESIDE, COMPUTER
CAPERS 4-7 (1978) (examples of physical attacks on computers).
13. S. MANDELL, supra note 12, at 161-62; see also T. WHITESIDE, supra note 12, at 11-18
(describing the crime in detail). The $2 billion figure includes the estimated market losses
suffered by the Equity Funding Corporation stockholders; the audited figures estimated
only a $200 million loss. D. PARKER, CRIME BY COMPUTER 28 (1976).
14. Becker, Rifkin, A Documentary History, 2 CoMp. L.J. 471, 474 (1980).
15. D. PARKER, supra note 13, at 192-203.
16. D. PARKER, S. NYCUM & S. OURA, COMPUTER ABUSE (1973).
17. See D. PARKER, supra note 13, at 28-30. The SRI figures have stirred some contro-
versy. After exhaustive analysis, one commentator concluded that the SRI study is "unrelia-
ble because it is based on poor documentation, unacceptable methods, and unverified (in-
deed unverifiable) losses." Taber, A Survey of Computer Crime Studies, 2 COMP. L.J. 275,
310 (1980). This same commentator analyzed a GAO study that concluded that the average
computer crime loss was $44,110-less than one-tenth of the SRI estimate. He concluded
that the GAO figures were more reliable than the SRI figures. Id. at 282-83 & n.44. Although
Donn Parker, a member of the SRI panel, admitted that he did not know the statistical
validity of the SRI's figures, D. PARKER, supra note 13, at 28, the tenor of his statistical
discussion indicates that he believed the estimates to be basically sound. See id. at 23-30.
At least one commentator has concluded that the discrepancies between the findings of
the two studies reveal fundamental research problems and not simply data collecting biases.
See S. MANDELL, supra note 12, at 156. Regardless of the statistical validity issue, however,
legislatures have enacted computer-assisted crime legislation at least partially in response to
alarmist reports such as the SRI study. The question no longer is whether this country has a
computer-assisted crime problem that needs legislative attention; it is whether the recently
enacted legislation will permit successful prosecution of computer-assisted crimes.
18. D. PARKER, supra note 13, at 32-33. According to Mr. Parker:
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enforcement authorities also began to realize that many computer-
assisted crimes were easy to accomplish but difficult to detect. 9
They discovered that most computer-assisted crimes either went
Assets tend to be more highly concentrated in computer systems than in
equivalent manual systems. [Once access to the funds is accomplished] it is
just as easy [for the computer-assisted perpetrator] to steal a million dollars as
it is one dollar. . . [Further,] the opportunity for theft of larger amounts...
is far greater with the same or smaller amount of effort by the perpetrator.
Id. at 33; accord Taber, supra note 17, at 287 & n.49.
A comparison of traditional and computer-assisted bank robbers illustrates Parker's the-
sis. Traditional robbers, who physically enter banks to carry out their crimes, are limited
not only by the amount of cash in the tellers' drawers or in the vault, but also by the
amount of money they can carry. On the other hand, once computer-assisted bank robbers
"enter" banks via computer, they quickly can transfer enormous sums to another bank ac-
count simply by pressing the right buttons, and the sums available to computer-assisted
robbers typically far exceed the cash stored in the banks themselves. Cf. Becker, supra note
14 (explaining how the Security Pacific National Bank theft was accomplished).
19. Fraudulent data crimes and theft of computer services are perhaps the easiest
computer-assisted crimes to commit and the most difficult to detect, which probably ex-
plains why they are so prevalent.
GAO studies have shown that "the majority of computer crimes against the Federal gov-
ernment-about 62%-involved [fraudulent data input]." 125 CONG. REC. 1195 (1979)
(statement of Donald L. Scantlebury, Dir. of Fin. & Gen. Mgmt. Studies Div., GAO); see
also Roddy, supra note 12, at 348 n.40 (placing the figure at 62-80%). Either an operator
who types information into a computer or an unauthorized user who alters existing data can
accomplish fraudulent data entry. Detection is difficult for two reasons. First, "literally mil-
lions of Federal actions take place regularly on automated systems without anyone checking
them for correctness." Id. Second, even if someone does attempt to run a check, stored
computer data is invisible until actually printed. The printout obtained after a fraudulent
data entry has occurred will appear perfectly normal, and the altered data will appear suspi-
cious only if the figures are abnormally high or low. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REc. S1179 (daily
ed. Feb. 8, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Cohen) (noting that hackers had penetrated credit bureau
computer and had changed credit ratings of prominent persons); 130 CONG. REC. E633 (daily
ed. Feb. 27, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Wyden) (noting that hackers had gained access to cancer
patient records at Sloane Kettering Cancer Center and had gained ability to change radia-
tion doses).
The other prevalent computer crime, theft of computer services, apparently is a wide-
spread problem in the business world. Some businesses even condone the problem. Taber,
supra note 12, at 530-31; see infra note 20; infra note 223 and accompanying text. Thefts of
computer services often are discovered only by accident. See, e.g., United States v. Seidlitz,
589 F.2d 152, 154 & n.5 (4th Cir. 1978) (computer specialist noticed an access code in use
that belonged to a supervisor not then using the computer), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922
(1979); Gemignani, supra note 12, at 713-18 (discussing State v. Thommen, No. 79-424B
(Ind. Crim. Ct. Feb. 14, 1980) (fellow employee noticed computer printout of highly confi-
dential program on defendant's desk)); cf. State v. McGraw, 459 N.E.2d 61, 63 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1984) (defendant's unauthorized use was revealed, after his dismissal, when former
colleague refused to copy defendant's illegal data files); Lund v. Commonwealth, 217 Va.
688, 689-90, 232 S.E.2d 745, 747 (1977) (graduate student who charged computer time worth
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undiscovered or unreported 0 and, perhaps most importantly, that
existing laws could not handle the novel aspects of computer-as-
sisted crime."
These considerations led the Senate Governmental Affairs Com-
mittee in 1976 to examine the need for federal computer crime leg-
islation.22 One year later, Senator Abraham Ribicoff introduced S.
1766, the first Federal Computer Systems Protection Act.2 3 Al-
though this bill never passed Congress, each succeeding Congress
has considered comprehensive federal computer-assisted crime leg-
islation.24 Pressure to enact this type of legislation was particularly
more than $26,000 to various university departments was caught when the departments fi-
nally complained about the unauthorized charges).
20. Many victimized businesses prefer for several reasons not to report computer-assisted
crimes. Some businesses, especially financial institutions, seem to fear lessened public confi-
dence, which may result in declining stock value, lower employee morale, and lost business.
129 CONG.. REc. E2429 (daily ed. May 19, 1983) (statement of Rep. Wyden); J. BECKER,
supra note 12, at 5; Roddy, supra note 12, at 347 n.34; Sokolik, Computer Crime-The
Need for Deterrent Legislation, 2 COMP. L.J. 353, 359 (1980). Others fear that trial publicity
may prompt a subsequent break-in, and that they will not be able to secure the computer.
Sokolik, supra, at 359. Other concerns include a belief that the benefits gained from a con-
viction do not outweigh the costs of assisting in the investigation and prosecution of the
case, J. BECKER, supra note 12, at 6, and skepticism about the effectiveness of the criminal
justice system, id.
21. The existing laws are deficient primarily in defining the common law crime of larceny,
R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 292 (3d ed. 1982), and its statutory rela-
tives-embezzlement, id. at 354, and false pretenses, id. at 364. Difficulties that may arise in
computer-assisted crime cases involving these crimes include: (1) the possibility that the
court may find that computer-related intangibles are not "property" for the purposes of a
larceny prosecution, see Ward v. Superior Court, 3 CLSR 206 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972) (elec-
tronic impulses); Lund v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 688, 692, 232 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1977)
(computer time and services); (2) the possibility that the jury may not find that the defend-
ant intended permanently to deprive the true owner of possession, see S. MANDELL, supra
note 12, at 164; and (3) the lack of any easy method to calculate the market value of com-
puter-related intangibles, such as computer data or programs, which may prompt courts to
use the actual value of the tangible property involved as the value of the goods stolen, see
e.g., Lund v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 688, 692, 232 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1977) (holding that, in
the absence of market value, the court must use the actual value of a computer
printout-the scrap value of the paper).
22. 125 CONG. REC. 1191 (1979) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff).
23. S. 1766, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 21,025 (1977); see also Federal Com-
puter Systems Protection Act: Hearings on S. 1766 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws
and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as Hearings, S. 1766]. An identical bill was introduced in the House of Repre-
sentatives. H.R. 8421, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 23,720 (1977).
24. H.R. 930, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 131 CONG. REc. H294 (dally ed. Feb. 4, 1985); S. 2940,
98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S10,257 (daily ed. Aug. 9, 1984); S. 2270, 98th Cong., 2d
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:783
strong in 1983 and 1984, when twelve related bills also were intro-
duced in Congress. 25  This legislative surge may have been
prompted by the increasing popularity and availability of inexpen-
sive personal computers 26 and of the communications devices
required to link them.27  These technological advances have
Seass., 130 CONG. REC. Sl180 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1984); S. 1733, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG.
REC. Sl1,448 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1983); H.R. 1092, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H219
(daily ed. Jan. 31, 1983) (companion bill to S. 1733); H.R. 3970, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127
CONG. REC. 13,014 (1981); H.R. 6192, 96th Cong., 1st Seass., 125 CONG. REC. 36,991 (1979); S.
240, 96th Cong., 1st Seass., 125 CONG. REC. 1190 (1979) (companion bill to H.R. 6192).
25. These proposals addressed many aspects of computer-assisted crime, including abuse
of the social security system equipment and resources, H.R. 2619, 98th Cong., 1st Seass., 129
CONG. REC. H2190 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1983), protection from computer-assisted crime for
small businesses, S. 1920, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S13,560 (daily ed. Oct. 4,
1983); H.R. 3075, 98th Cong., 1st Seass., 129 CONG. REc. H3144, E2429 (daily ed. May 19,
1983) (companion bill to S. 1920) (enacted July 16, 1984), counterfeiting of access devices,
and computer fraud and abuse, H.R. 3570, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H5196
(daily ed. July 14, 1983), criminal penalties for computer abuse, H.R. 4259, 98th Cong., 1st
Seass., 129 CONG. REc. H8907 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1983) (also proposing an interagency com-
mittee to consider computer crime and abuse), other computer-assisted crimes, H.R. 4301,
98th Cong., 1st Seass., 129 CONG. REc. H9212 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1983), unauthorized access to
medical records via telecommunication devices, H.R. 4954, 98th Cong., 2d Seass., 130 CONG.
REC. H916 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984), counterfeiting of access devices and other computer
fraud and abuse, H.R. 5112, 98th Cong., 2d Seass., 130 CONG. REc. H1574 (daily ed. Mar. 13,
1984) (evolved from H.R. 3570), fraud and related activities connected with access devices
and computers, S. 2862, 98th Cong., 2d Seass., 130 CONG. REc. S9223 (daily ed. July 25, 1984);
H.R. 5616, 98th Cong., 2d Seass., 130 CONG. REC. H3561 (daily ed. May 8, 1984) (companion
bill to S. 2862) (enacted Oct. 12, 1984), unauthorized direct access to or alteration of indi-
vidual medical records via telecommunication devices, H.R. 5831, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130
CONG. REC. H5677 (daily ed. June 12, 1984) (passed House, 130 CONG. REc. H9637 (daily ed.
Sept. 17, 1984)), and computer fraud involving interstate or foreign commerce, S. 2940, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. Rac. S10,257 (daily ed. Aug. 9, 1984).
Two of these twelve bills became law in 1984. H.R. 3075 was enacted as the Small Busi-
ness Computer Security and Education Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-362, 98 Stat. 431 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 632(j)(1)(A)-(B), 633(b)(3), 637(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1986)), and
H.R. 5616 was enacted as the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 21, 98 Stat. 2190 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West
Supp. 1986)).
26. In 1981, all computer manufacturers together sold 500,000 computers suitable for
home use. Just two years later, in September 1983, one computer magazine publisher pre-
dicted that IBM alone would sell 2,000,000 personal computers in 1984. Bunnell, PC 1984,
PC WORLD, Jan. 1984, at 14. One survey of 20 personal computer manufacturers indicated a
price range of $799 to $12,995. See F. RHOADS & J. EDWARDS, supra note 7, §§ 2.07-2.27.
27. Remotely located computers communicate primarily through "modems" (modulator-
demodulators), which convert digital output signals containing computer data to analog sig-
nals that can be transferred over telephone lines. Jordan, The Modem Market, PC WORLD,
Nov. 1983, at 88. The market for modems has been described as "exploding," id., and one
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spawned numerous instances of vandalism and mischief by "hack-
ers," many of whom are adolescents."8 With hackers' exploits at-
tracting widespread media attention, congressional concern
mounted, resulting in the numerous computer-related bills intro-
duced in Congress in 1983 and 1984.29
State legislatures have acted against computer-assisted crime far
more swiftly and more successfully than Congress. Beginning with
Arizona, which acted in 1978,30 forty-five states have enacted com-
puter-assisted crime legislation. Twenty-three3 1 of these states ap-
parently modeled their statutes primarily on the 1977 or 1979 ver-
sions of the proposed Federal Computer Systems Protection Act,32
while twenty33 enacted comprehensive computer-assisted crime
survey of modem manufacturers indicated a price range of $145 to $1195, see Hayes,
Modems, in PC WORLD (ANNUAL HARDWARE REVIEW) 134-43 (1984).
28. "Hackers" are individuals who use remotely located computers to break the security
codes of other computer systems, thereby gaining unauthorized access to those systems
through telephone linkups. For descriptions of several incidents involving hackers, see
Cracking Down on Hackers, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 24, 1983, at 34; Beware: Hackers at Play,
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 5, 1983, at 42-48; Dobbin, Watch Out Roscoe, Susan Thunder, et al: Com-
puter Criminals Get Caught, Baltimore Sun, June 6, 1983, at -, col. - (reprinted in 129
CONG. REC. E2708 (daily ed. June 6, 1983)).
29. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
30. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2301E, 13-2316 (1978 & Supp. 1986).
31. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2301E, 13-2316 (1978 & Supp. 1986); CAL. PENAL CODE §
502 (West Supp. 1986); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 18-5.5-101 to -102 (1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, §§ 931-939, 2738 (Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9-90 to -95 (1984); HAWAII REV.
STAT. §§ 708-890 to -896 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-2201 to -2202 (Supp. 1986); Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 434.840 to .860 (1985); Mxc. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 752.791 to .797 (West
Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.87 to .89 (West Supp. 1986); MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-
2-101, 45-6-310 to -311 (1985); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 205.473 to .477 (1986); NM STAT. ANN. §§
30-16A-1 to -4 (1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-453 to -457 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-
06.1-01(3), 12.1-06.1-08 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1951-1956 (West Supp. 1985);
OR. REv. STAT. § 164.377 (1985); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3933 (Purdon Supp. 1986); RI
GEN. LAWS §§ 11-52-1 to -5 (1981 & Supp. 1986); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-16-10 to -40 (Law.
Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3-1401 to -1406 (Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-
6-701 to -704 (Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.70 (West Supp. 1986).
32. S. 240, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 1190 (1979); S. 1766, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 21,025 (1977).
33. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-8-100 to -103 (Supp. 1986); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.46.200(a)(3), .740,
.985, .990(1), (3)-(7) (Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-250 to -261 (1985); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 815.02 to .07 (West Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 1 16-9 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-43-1-4, -2-3 (Burns Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. §§
716A.1 to .16 (West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3755 (Supp. 1985); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 14:73.1 to .5 (West 1986); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 146 (Supp. 1986); MIss. CODE
ANN. §§ 97-45-1 to -13 (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 569.093 to .099 (Vernon Supp.
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statutes less closely related to the proposed federal legislation. The
other two states, Ohio and Massachusetts, took another tack,
choosing only to redefine certain terms in their criminal codes to
ensure that their statutes covered computers and computer-related
intangible property.34 Ohio took the more expansive approach, by
expanding its definitions of "property,"3 5 "services," 6 and "writ-
ing,"'37 and by adding six new computer-related definitions, 8 while
Massachusetts chose only to redefine the term "property" in its
larceny statute to include computer-related intangibles.3 9
The Virginia General Assembly originally responded to the
computer-assisted crime problem by redefining the term "prop-
erty" in its larceny statute in a manner similar to the Massachu-
setts statute.40 The General Assembly repealed this statute in
1984,'4 1 however, and replaced it with the Virginia Computer
Crimes Act42 (Act). This comprehensive statute attempts to define
and prohibit several categories of computer-assisted crime.
This Note scrutinizes the Virginia Computer Crimes Act to de-
termine whether it has removed every obstacle to successful prose-
cution of those who commit computer-assisted crimes. The analy-
sis begins with the computer-related definitions contained in the
Act's glossary, and proceeds through each of the Act's penal sec-
tions, referring both to the proposed federal legislation and to the
computer-assisted crime statutes of other states, when appropriate.
The analysis reveals that, although the Act has solved some of the
1986); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-1343 to -1348 (Supp. 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 638:16 to
:19 (Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:20-1(g), :20-23 to -34 (West Supp. 1986); S.D. Cowi-
FIED LAWS ANN. §§ 43-2-2, 43-43B-1 to -8 (1983 & Supp. 1984); TEx. PENAL CODE §§ 33.01
to .05 (Vernon Supp. 1986); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-152.1 to .14 (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 9A.48.100, .52.110 to .130, .56.010 (West 1977 & Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-3-501
to -505 (1983 & Supp. 1986).
34. Alabama also took this approach at first, see ALA. CODE § 13A-8-10 (1982), but it
subsequently enacted comprehensive computer-assisted crime legislation. See id. §§ 13A-8-
100 to -103 (Supp. 1986).
35. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01(J) (Page Supp. 1985).
36. Id. § 2913.01(E).
37. Id. § 2913.01(F).
38. Id. § 2913.01(L)-(Q).
39. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 30(2) (West Supp. 1986).
40. VA. CODE § 18.2-98.1 (1982) (repealed 1984).
41. Act of Apr. 11, 1984, ch. 751, 1984 Va. Acts 1759.
42. VA. CODE §§ 18.2-152.1 to .14 (Supp. 1986).
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unique problems posed by computer-assisted crimes, and although
it does not contain some of the flaws that have marred other
computer-assisted crime legislation, the Act still has some serious
problems. In particular, the Act employs a vague definition of
"computer," it still includes needless computer jargon, and it is re-
plete with unnecessary and redundant penal sections. These
problems, if not corrected, will seriously hamper the Act's
effectiveness.
COMPUTER-RELATED DEFINITIONS IN THE VIRGINIA COMPUTER
CRIMES ACT
The Act, like virtually every comprehensive computer-assisted
crime statute, 4 begins with a glossary that defines the computer-
related terms used throughout the statute." Ideally, in addition to
evidencing legislative intent, such a glossary should provide a com-
prehensive, yet flexible definition of "computer," and it should
eliminate technical computer jargon, which is not helpful in defin-
ing offenses under the law. When necessary, the glossary also
should broaden common law property definitions to include com-
puter-related intangibles within the scope of property that can be
the subject of larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses. Judged
by these standards, and set against the backdrop of analogous fed-
eral and state definitions, the Act generally improves upon the
glossaries contained in the proposed federal computer crime legis-
lation and in the state legislation based on the federal proposals.
The Virginia Act's glossary falls far short of the ideal, however,
because its definition of "computer" may be fatally vague, its defi-
nition of "computer program" is overly technical and confusing,
and unnecessary computer jargon remains.
The Definition of "Computer"
The success of any computer-assisted crime statute depends
upon its definition of "computer," because the meaning of this
term delimits the statute's coverage. Unfortunately, this term also
43. See, e.g., S. 1766, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 21,025 (1977) (proposed 18
U.S.C. § 1028(c)); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2301E (Supp. 1986); CAL PENAL CODE § 502(a)
(West Supp. 1986).
44. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.2 (Supp. 1986).
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provides the legislature's greatest definitional challenge. As the
House Committee on the Judiciary stated in 1984, "[tlhe whole is-
sue of defining the word "computer" has plagued the consideration
of computer crime legislation since its early days. '45 Even the com-
puter industry cannot agree on a single meaning for "computer." '46
Ideally, the definition should be "broad enough to include nonelec-
tronic computers. . . narrow enough to exclude a variety of elec-
tronic devices which rely on microprocessing circuitry . . . and
flexible enough to cover technological advances. 4 7
Early legislative attempts to define "computer" failed to meet
this standard. For example, the first federal proposal defined
"computer" as "an electronic device which performs logical, arith-
metic, and memory functions by the manipulations of electronic or
magnetic impulses, and includes [all related equipment] . ' 48 Com-
mentators criticized this definition both as overly narrow, 49 be-
cause it excluded sophisticated nonelectronic computers, and as
overly broad,50 because it included hand-held calculators, digital
watches, and any other electronic devices fitted with micro-
processors, even when those devices were not designed primarily
for data processing functions. 1
45. H.R. REP. No. 894, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3689, 3709.
46. Computer Systems Protection Act of 1979, S. 240: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980)
(statement of Sen. Laxalt) [hereinafter cited as Hearings, S. 240]. Compare D. SPENCER,
COMPUTER DICTIONARY FOR EVERYONE 50 (1979) (defining "computer" as "[a] device
designed to execute a sequence of mathematical or logical operations automatically") with
M. WEIK, STANDARD DICTIONARY OF COMPUTERS AND INFORMATION PROCESSING 79 (1969) (de-
fining "computer" as "[a] device capable of solving problems by accepting data, performing
prescribed operations on the data, and supplying the results of these operations") and C.
SIPPL, COMPUTER DICTIONARY 44 (1966) (defining "computer" as "[a] device capable of ac-
cepting information, applying prescribed processes to the information, and supplying the
results of these processes").
47. Roddy, supra note 12, at 361; see Gemignani, supra note 12, at 712.
48. S. 1766, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 21,025 (1977) (proposed 18 U.S.C. §
1028(c)(2)). S. 240, the successor bill to S. 1766, contained the same definition. S. 240, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 1190 (1979) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 1028(c)(2)).
49. Roddy, supra note 12, at 361; Gemignani, supra note 12, at 708.
50. Gemignani, supra note 12, at 708.
51. Roddy, supra note 12, at 361 n.129 (calculators and digital wristwatches); Gemignani,
supra note 12, at 708, 709 n.155 (electronic watches and automated traffic signals); see also
supra note 11 (other devices fitted with microprocessing circuitry that the federal definition
would consider "computers").
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The commentators' complaint that the definition was overly
broad should not be construed as a charge of unconstitutional
overbreadth;5 2 instead, it seems more properly a charge that the
definition is too vague. Under the void for vagueness doctrine, en-
actments that prohibit certain activity may violate due process if
they do not define the scope of that prohibition with adequate
clarity. As the Supreme Court has noted:
It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void
for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined ...
[B]ecause we assume that man is free to steer between lawful
and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of or-
dinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap
the innocent by not providing fair warning. 3
An illustration of the vagueness problems in many computer-
assisted crime statutes is provided by the eighteen states that have
adopted the early federal definition of "computer."54 In seventeen
52. Overbreadth is a first amendment doctrine that courts use to invalidate laws that
sweep within their prohibitions "'activities that constitute an exercise' of protected expres-
sive or associational rights." L. TRISE, AMERICAN CONSITUTIONAL LAW § 12-24, at 710 (1978)
(quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940)). According to Professor Tribe, a law
may be void for overbreadth, on its face, if a significant portion of the law's target consists
of protected activity and if the unconstitutional portions cannot be excised from the law in
a single step. Id. at 711. Professor Tribe also notes that an otherwise valid law may be
invalid for overbreadth, as applied, if it is enforced against protected activity. Id.
Typical computer-assisted crime statutes will pass both levels of overbreadth analysis. A
court never could find a computer-assisted crime statute invalid for overbreadth on its face,
because these laws do not target protected expression. Computer-assisted crime statutes
also would not be invalid for overbreadth as applied, because they are enforced against con-
duct, not expression. Even the provision in computer-assisted crime statutes that arguably
comes the closest to banning speech-the ban on mere unauthorized computer use, see, e.g.,
COLo. REv. STAT. § 18-5.5-102(2) (1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 932 (Supp. 1984)-does
not prohibit protected expression. Instead, it bans theft of an item that facilitates expres-
sion-computer time and services. All agree that the government cannot prosecute a pro-
tester merely for airing his views. The government, however, can and should prosecute that
individual for stealing a megaphone to amplify his voice, for breaking into a printshop to
print his leaflets, or for using his employer's computer without authority to compose his
speech. These prohibitions do not offend free speech values.
53. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
54. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.990(3) (Supp. 1986); Amuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2301E(2) (1978
& Supp. 1986); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-5.5-101(2) (1986); HAwAn Rxv. STAT. § 708-890 (Supp.
1984); IDAHO CODE § 18-2201(2) (Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 716A.1(2) (West Supp.
1986); MICH. Coi'. LAws ANN. § 752.792(2) (West Supp. 1986); MIN. STAT. ANN. § 609.87(3)
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of these eighteen states, an individual who merely uses another's
hand-held calculator without authorization can be prosecuted for a
computer-assisted crime.55 The public generally associates the
term "computer" with more sophisticated data processors, and
would not even begin to think of a hand-held calculator as a com-
puter; yet the statutory definition in these jurisdictions does not
dispel this perception by stating explicitly that, contrary to normal
expectation, a calculator is a "computer." 6 As a result, the statutes
proscribing unauthorized computer use in these states do not pro-
vide persons of ordinary intelligence with fair notice and warning
that unauthorized calculator use is a crime, and thus these stat-
utes should be considered void on vagueness grounds.
The Virginia General Assembly successfully addressed the criti-
cism that the first federal definition of "computer" was overly nar-
row by defining "computer" as including any "electronic, magnetic,
optical, hydraulic or organic" device.57 The General Assembly
(West Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(8) (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.4735
(1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16A-2(B) (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-01(3)(b) (1985);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.01(M) (Page Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1952(2)
(West Supp. 1985); OR. REv. STAT. § 164.377(1)(b) (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-1(B)
(1981); TEx. PENAL CODE § 33.01(2) (Vernon Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.70(1)(a)
(West Supp. 1986).
55. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.200(a)(3) (Supp. 1986); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2316B
(1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-102(2) (1986); HAWAII RE V. STAT. § 708-896 (Supp. 1984);
IDAHO CODE § 18-2202(2) (Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 716A.2 (West Supp. 1986); MicH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.795 (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.89(1)(a) (West Supp.
1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-311(1)(a) (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.4765(1)(d) (1986);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16A-4 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-08(2) (1985); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2913.04 (Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1953(4) (West Supp. 1985); O.
REv. STAT. § 164.377(4) (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-3 (Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
943.70(3)(a)(2) (West Supp. 1986).
The sole exception is Texas, which requires either that the unauthorized user breach a
security system, TEX. PENAL CODE § 33.02 (Vernon Supp. 1986), or that the unauthorized
user somehow harm the computer or computer data, id. § 33.03.
56. This logic applies with even greater force to digital watches, and to any electronic
device that uses microprocessing circuitry solely to monitor performance or to time opera-
tions. Ordinary people simply do not consider these devices computers.
57. The definition reads, in full:
"Computer" means an electronic, magnetic, optical, hydraulic or organic de-
vice or group of devices which, pursuant to a computer program, to human
instruction, or to permanent instructions contained in the device or group of
devices, can automatically perform computer operations with or on computer
data and can communicate the results to another computer or to a person. The
term "computer" includes any connected or directly related device, equipment,
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included this phrase specifically to ensure that the definition "will
apply to technology which appears after the Act is in effect. For
example, 'organic device' was included because of the developing
technology of biological memory. .... -58 The Virginia definition,
however, remains open to a charge that it is overly broad. When
read with reference to other terms in the glossary, for example, the
Act's definition of "computer" includes a hand-held calculator: "an
electronic . ..device which pursuant . .. to human instruction
. . . can automatically perform [arithmetic functions] 59. . .. on
[numbers] 60 and can communicate the results ...to a person."81
Consequently, in Virginia a person who willfully uses another's
hand-held calculator without authority-that is, one who uses it
intentionally and with a bad purpose-theoretically commits the
crime of computer theft of services, a Class 1 misdemeanor.62
An ordinary person, however, usually does not consider hand-
held calculators to be computers, and the Act's definition does not
adequately inform such a person that calculators are "computers,"
for purposes of the Act, by stating explicitly that the definition
covers these devices. As a result, unless the unauthorized calcula-
tor user had been able to discover that the Act covers calculators,
or facility which enables the computer to store, retrieve or communicate com-
puter programs, computer data or the results of computer operations to or
from a person, another computer or device.
VA. CODE § 18.2-152.2 para. 1 (Supp. 1986). The Act separately defines "computer data," id.
para. 2, "computer operations," id. para. 4, and "computer program," id. para. 5.
58. Burke, Virginia's Response to Computer Abuses: An Act in Five Crimes, 19 U. RicIL
L. RE V. 85, 93 (1984).
59. The Act includes "arithmetic functions" within its definition of "computer opera-
tions." VA. CODE § 18.2-152.2 para. 4 (Supp. 1986).
60. The Act includes "numbers" within its definition of "computer data," because a num-
ber can be a "representation of information, knowledge, facts, concepts or instructions
which is being prepared or has been prepared and is intended to be processed ... in a
computer." Id. para. 2.
61. See supra note 57.
62. The Virginia computer theft of services statute provides: "Any person who willfully
uses a computer or computer network, with intent to obtain computer services without au-
thority, shall be guilty of the crime of theft of computer services, which shall be punishable
as a Class 1 misdemeanor." VA. CODE § 18.2-152.6 (Supp. 1986). A Class 1 misdemeanor is
punishable by "confinement in jail for not more than twelve months and a fine of not more
than $1,000, either or both." Id. § 18.2-11 (1982).
For a discussion of the willfulness requirement, see infra notes 227-28 and accompanying
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by putting together the appropriate parts of three lengthy, compli-
cated definitional sections,"3 that person could be charged with
computer theft of services without any notice that unauthorized
calculator use is prohibited by law. Admittedly, the individual
acted with a bad purpose-that is, one that was morally im-
proper-but moral impropriety alone does not make an act crimi-
nal. A law purporting to criminalize an act must provide "fair
warning" so that "the person of ordinary intelligence [has] a rea-
sonable opportunity to know what is prohibited,"64 and so that
criminal responsibility attaches only to acts that individuals "rea-
sonably understand to be proscribed" by law.6 5 Because the Vir-
ginia definition of "computer" does not provide "fair warning" to
"the person of ordinary intelligence," a vagueness challenge to the
definition might be successful, although Virginia's "willfulness" re-
quirement does introduce an element of doubt that is not present
with respect to the state statutes that employ the original federal
definition of "computer."
Even the mere possibility of vulnerability to a vagueness chal-
lenge is troublesome, however, because if someone were to succeed
in challenging the definition of "computer" the entire Act would
fail. The Act does contain a severability section designed to save
provisions that "can be given effect without the invalid provi-
sion,"6' 6 but that section would not save the Act if the definition of
"computer" were to be found invalid, because the definition is so
interwoven with all of the Act's remaining provisions that its inva-
lidity would frustrate the legislative purpose in enacting computer-
assisted crime legislation. A severability section merely reverses
the presumption that the provisions of a statute comprise an in-
separable whole and replaces it with a presumption of severabil-
ity.67 In this case, if the definition of "computer" were excised from
63. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
64. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); see supra note 53 and accom-
panying text.
65. See supra note 53 and accompanying text; Flannery v. City of Norfolk, 216 Va. 362,
365, 218 S.E.2d 730, 733 (1975) (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972),
which, in turn, was quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)), appeal dis-
missed, 424 U.S. 936 (1976).
66. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.13 (Supp. 1986).
67. A statute will fail as a whole upon a finding that one provision is invalid, despite a
severability provision, if the evidence adduces "'the clear probability that the legislature
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the Act due to invalidity, the presumption would be rebutted and
the entire Act would fail, because every other provision in the Act
depends upon the definition of "computer."
The Virginia General Assembly should make its intent clear.
Most likely, the General Assembly did not intend the Act to target
unauthorized calculator users, or users of other electronic devices
that people generally do not think of as "computers," because the
harm caused by unauthorized users of these devices is minimal and
hardly worth the State's notice, and because the law should not
punish such innocuous activity. If this is the case, the General As-
sembly should exclude calculators and other such devices from the
definition of "computer."68 On the other hand, if the General As-
sembly did intend to prohibit unauthorized use of such devices,
the prohibition should be stated explicitly, to avoid a vagueness
challenge.
The best alternative would be for the General Assembly to re-
draft the definition of "computer" to incorporate, with modifica-
tion, the improvements reflected in the definition first proposed in
the Federal Computer Crime Prevention Act of 1983.69 The
would not have been satisfied with the statute unless it had included the invalid part.'
Whether the provisions are so interwoven that one being held invalid the others must fall,
presents a question of statutory construction and of legislative intent." Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238, 312-13 (1936) (quoting Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165,
184-85 (1932)); Hannabass v. Maryland Cas. Co., 169 Va. 559, 571, 194 S.E. 808, 813 (1938)
(quoting with approval Carter Coal),
68. In interpreting penal statutes, the courts have extended their prohibitions only to acts
that not only are within the letter but also are within the spirit of the statute in question.
See Price v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 383, 386, 164 S.E.2d 676, 679 (1968) (quoting McKin-
ney v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 239, 243, 148 S.E.2d 829, 831-32 (1966)). Although this rule
of interpretation might prevent application of the Act to users of calculators and other simi-
lar devices, the result would be much more certain if the General Assembly amended the
Act to make clear its legislative intent.
The initial draft of the Virginia Computer Crimes Act did exclude hand-held calculators,
but that exclusion was removed when opposition to a related limitation surfaced in the
House. See Burk, supra note 58, at 90; infra note 78.
69. S. 1733, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S11,448 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1983); H.R.
1092, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. H219 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1983) (companion bill to
S. 1733). The definition reads, in full:
'[C]omputer' means an electronic, magnetic, optical, hydraulic, organic, or
other high speed data processing device or system performing logical, arithme-
tic, or storage functions, and includes any property, data storage facility, or
communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with
such device or system; but does not include an automated typewriter or type-
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limitations contained in this definition first exclude devices that
usually are not considered "computers," by confining the term to
high speed data processing devices or systems, and then exclude
those high speed data processors that usually are not involved in
computer-assisted crimes.70 These limitations, if added to the Vir-
ginia definition of "computer" in the proper manner, would
strengthen the Act significantly. First, the "high speed data
processing device or system" 7' 1 limitation could replace the ex-
tremely broad "device or group of devices" language contained in
the Virginia definition of "computer, 7 2 thereby excluding devices
that use microprocessing circuitry primarily to monitor perform-
ance, to enhance performance, or to time operations, rather than to
process data generally. This modification would exclude high-tech
automobiles, dishwashers, refrigerators, microwave ovens, power
tools, and other products designed to perform tasks that only inci-
dentally involve data processing.73 These devices simply do not be-
long within the coverage of a computer-assisted crime statute. On
the other hand, this modification would not exclude other devices,
such as automated teller machines (ATM's),74 that are merely com-
ponents of larger computer systems, because the Virginia Act still
setter, a portable hand-held calculator, or any computer designed and manu-
factured for, and which is used exclusively for, routine personal, family, or
household purposes and which is not used to access, to communicate with, or
to manipulate any other computer.
S. 1733, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S11,448 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1983) (proposed 18
U.S.C. § 1028(c)(1)) (emphasis added); H.R. 1092, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 129 CONG. REC.
H219 (daily ed. Jan 31, 1983) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 1028(c)(1)) (emphasis added).
70. See supra note 69 (italicized portions). These exclusions first were proposed during
consideration of S. 240 at the subcommittee level. Hearings, S. 240, supra note 46, at 2
(statement of Sen. Hatch).
Congress targeted four categories of computer-assisted crime: "First. The introduction of
fraudulent records or data into the computer system; Second. The unauthorized use of com-
puter related facilities; Third. The alteration or destruction of information or files[;] and
Fourth. The stealing, whether by electronic means or otherwise, of money, financial instru-
ments, property, services, or valuable data." 125 CONG. REc. 1191 (1979) (statement of Sen.
Ribicoff).
71. See supra note 69.
72. See supra note 57.
73. See supra notes 11 & 51 and accompanying text.
74. An automated teller machine contains microprocessing circuitry, but does not actually
process data. An ATM receives data from the customer, transmits that data to the bank's
central computer, receives instructions back from the central computer, and completes the
customer's transaction by executing those instructions.
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would include the phrase "related device[s and] equipment,"
which would encompass ATM's.7 5 Second, the limitation enumer-
ating specific devices not included in the definition of "computer"
would exclude two categories of general data processing devices
that are unlikely to be involved in computer-assisted crimes: first,
automated typewriters, automated typesetters, and portable hand-
held calculators, 8 which are manufactured to perform a single
function and are not adaptable for general-purpose computing; and
second, general-purpose computers "designed and manufactured
for, and . . used exclusively for, routine personal, family, or
household purposes" that cannot interact with other computers, as
installed.7 This two-part limitation would cause the definition of
"computer" to focus on only those computers likely to be involved
in computer-assisted crimes: general-purpose computers used by
governmental, educational, and commercial institutions; and
general-purpose computers intended for personal, family, or house-
hold purposes that hackers can use to interact with other
computers.
The Virginia General Assembly should adopt both limitations to
the definition of "computer. 7 8 Before adopting the second limita-
tion, however, Virginia should delete the phrase "designed and
manufactured for" used in the proposed federal definition to
75. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.2 para. 1 (Supp. 1986) ("The term 'computer' includes any con-
nected or directly related device, equipment, or facility which enables the computer to store,
retrieve or communicate computer programs, computer data or the results of computer op-
erations to or from a person, another computer or another device.").
76. See supra note 69.
77. Id.
78. The first two versions of the Virginia Computer Crimes Act offered in the Virginia
House of Delegates, H.B. 6, 1984 Sess., and H.B. 289, 1984 Sess., included both federal
limitations. These limitations, however, were excised from later versions of the Act, see H.B.
6, 1984 Sess.; S. 347, 1984 Sess., ostensibly because the second limitation "placed too heavy
a burden on the prosecution to prove that the computer involved was actually manufactured
or used for a business purpose." Burk, supra note 58, at 90. This reasoning is curious; the
General Assembly could have addressed most of its concern simply by deleting the phrase
"designed and manufactured for" in the second limitation, which would make the purpose
for manufacturing the computer irrelevant. See infra text accompanying note 79. The sec-
ond portion of the General Assembly's concern, proving whether the computer had been
used for a business purpose, actually would pose little concern. Because the only computers
excluded by the second limitation would be computers installed in the home that could not
interact with other computers, the only cases likely to arise involving such computers would
be ones arising in a business context.
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modify the exclusively "routine personal, family, or household" use
exclusion. A computer designed and manufactured for business
use, but used in the home for nonbusiness purposes, is no more
likely to become the tool of a computer-assisted criminal than a
computer designed specifically for home use. Irrespective of the
use for which it was designed, a computer used exclusively for
"personal, family, or household purposes," and incapable, as in-
stalled, of communicating with other computers, poses very little
danger to society. 79 The "designed and manufactured for" phrase,
therefore, unnecessarily restricts the home use exclusion, and Vir-
ginia should not adopt that phrase in its revised definition of
"computer."
A redrafted definition of "computer," incorporating each of the
preceding recommended changes, would read:
"Computer" means an electronic, magnetic, optical, hydraulic,
or organic high speed data processing device or system which,
pursuant to a computer program, to human instruction, or to
permanent instructions contained in the device or system, can
automatically perform computer operations with or on computer
data and can communicate the results to another computer or to
a person. The term "computer" includes any connected or di-
rectly related device, equipment, or facility which enables the
computer to store, retrieve, or communicate computer programs,
computer data, or the results of computer operations to or from
a person, another computer, or another device; but does not in-
clude an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand-
held calculator, or any computer which is used exclusively for
routine personal, family, or household purposes and which is not
used to communicate with or to manipulate any other computer.
The Use of Computer Jargon
Because no computer-assisted crime statute can avoid using
computer jargon completely, a legislature generally will define any
unavoidable jargon in the statute's glossary.80 If the legislature
79. Accord Burk, supra note 58, at 90 (noting that "[t]he purpose of this limitation was to
prevent prosecution of such insignificant acts as a child's use of his neighbor's computer to
play games").
80. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(a) (West Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815.03 (West
Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-23 (West Supp. 1986).
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uses jargon to define jargon, however, it defeats the goal of making
the definitions understandable. The General Assembly drafted the
Virginia Computer Crimes Act relatively free of computer jargon,
but it could make the Act even better in this regard by revising the
definition of "computer program"81 and by eliminating every refer-
ence to "computer software."82
Most commentators criticized the excessive use of computer
jargon in the proposed federal legislation, especially its use of the
noun "access" as a verb8 3 when the proper verb is "use." In re-
sponse, several state statutes, including the Virginia Computer
Crimes Act, substituted "use" for "access. 8 4 The Virginia Act de-
fines computer "use" in terms of specific conduct: (1) causing a
computer to perform or stop performing computer operations, (2)
causing the withholding or denial of a computer's use to another
user, or (3) causing another person to put false information into a
computer.8 5 The definition also includes any attempt to cause one
of these three results.8 6 This definition improves upon the federal
definition by categorizing specific uses and by replacing technical
terms with familiar words.87
81. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.2 para. 5 (Supp. 1986); see infra notes 88-92 and accompanying
text.
82. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.2 para. 7 (Supp. 1986); see infra notes 93-96 and accompanying
text.
83. Taber, supra note 12, at 537; see also Roddy, supra note 12, at 361 (criticizing the
ambiguity of "access"). The definitional section of the proposed federal legislation provided:
"'access' means to approach, instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve data from,
or otherwise make use of any resources of, a computer, computer system, or computer net-
work." S. 1766, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 21,025 (1977) (proposed 18 U.S.C. §
1028(c)(1)).
84. Colorado and Montana simply substituted the word "use" for "access," and retained
the federal definition with only minor, nonmaterial changes. See CoLo. REv. STAT. § 18-5.5-
101(10) (1986); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-310 (1985). Nevada and Wisconsin sidestepped the
jargon problem by eliminating the definition of "access," and prohibiting willful, knowing,
and unauthorized computer "use." NEv. Rxv. STAT. §§ 205.473 to .477 (1986); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 943.70 (West Supp. 1986). Virginia dropped "access" and defined "use." VA. CODE §
18.2-152.2 para. 12 (Supp. 1986).
85. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.2 para. 12 (Supp. 1986).
86. Id.
87. The federal definition of "access" also was criticized for being so broad that "it could
include the use of almost anything having something to do with a computer." Gemignani,
supra note 12, at 708. The Virginia definition of computer "use" likewise sweeps rather
broadly. For example, disconnecting a computer will cause it to stop performing computer
functions, falling to pay the computer owner might cause the withholding or denial of a
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Although this definition significantly improves upon the pro-
posed federal legislation, the General Assembly took a step back-
ward when it defined "computer program" as "an ordered set of
data representing coded instructions or statements that, when exe-
cuted by a computer, causes the computer to perform one or more
computer operations." 8 Definitions should facilitate statutory en-
forcement and interpretation; they should not obfuscate and in-
timidate. To facilitate enforcement and interpretation of a com-
puter-assisted crime statute, legislatures should define jargon with
words that law enforcement authorities can understand easily, and
not with mathematically technical phrases such as "an ordered set
of data representing coded instructions or statements." Definitions
that use familiar words and phrases are more workable and more
understandable.
Montana's computer-assisted crime statute, which defines "com-
puter program" as "an instruction or statement or a series of in-
structions or statements, in a form acceptable to a computer, that
in actual or modified form permits the functioning of a computer
or computer system and causes it to perform specified functions," 89
improves on the Virginia definition not only in its use of familiar,
less technical words, but also in two other respects. First, it recog-
nizes that a computer program may consist of a single instruction
or statement.9 0 Second, by eliminating the word "coded," the defi-
nition leaves no doubt that a computer program written in any
computer language will be "in a form acceptable to a computer,"
computer to another user, and inadvertently placing the wrong zip code on a computerized
order form will cause another person to put false information into a computer. The Act's
penal sections, however, require unauthorized computer use with the intent to commit some
further act; therefore, the "users" enumerated above would commit no crime unless they
possessed the intent to commit one of the proscribed acts. See VA. CODE §§ 18.2-152.3 to .7
(Supp. 1986).
88. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.2 para. 5 (Supp. 1986). Virginia borrowed most of this definition
from GA. CODE ANN. § 16.9-92(4) (1984). Burk, supra note 58, at 93 n.37.
89. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(10) (1985).
90. The Department of Justice made a similar suggestion with respect to the first pro-
posed federal legislation. 125 CONG. REc. 1194 (1979) (statement of John C. Keeney, Acting
Ass't Att'y Gen., Crim. Div.). That suggestion was incorporated in the next version of the
Federal Computer Systems Protection Act. S. 240, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc.
1191 (1979) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 1028(c)(8)).
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even if it is a paper copy of the program.9 Consequently, Virginia
should consider adopting the Montana definition, but in a slightly
modified form: "'Computer program' means one or more related
instructions or statements, composed and structured in a form ac-
ceptable to a computer, that, when executed by a computer in ac-
tual or modified form, cause it to perform one or more computer
operations. ' ' 2
The Act also suffers from its use of the computer jargon term
"computer software,"93 which the Act defines as "a set of computer
programs and associated documentation concerned with computer
data or with the operation of a computer, computer program, or
computer network. '94 The Virginia General Assembly should re-
place this definition with an addendum to the definition of "com-
puter program," providing: "'Computer program' shall include all
associated procedures and documentation." Although two of the
Act's penal sections apply to "computer software," ' 5 both of these
91. A paper copy of a computer program would fit the Montana definition because, once
"modified" by entry into the memory of a computer, it will permit the computer to perform
specified functions. See supra text accompanying note 89. Under the Virginia definition, on
the other hand, instructions and statements might not be considered "coded" until they
have been stored either in the internal or external memory of a computer.
92. "Computer operation" already is defined in the Virginia Act as "arithmetic, logical,
monitoring, storage or retrieval functions and any combinations thereof, [including], but
... not limited to, communication with, storage of data to, or retrieval of data from any
device or human hand manipulation of electronic or magnetic impulses [or] for a particular
computer... a function for which that computer was generally designed." VA. CODE § 18.2-
152.2 para. 4 (Supp. 1986).
93. One expert in the field observed at hearings on the first federal proposal: "[Tihe term
'software' should not be used because it is a jargon word that has several different mean-
ings. . . ." Hearings, S. 1766, supra note 23, at 54.
94. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.2 para. 7 (Supp. 1986). The model for this definition was Amiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2301 (1978). Burk, supra note 58, at 93 n.37.
95. VA. CODE §§ 18.2-152.4, .8 (Supp. 1986). Section 18.2-152.4, which prohibits "com-
puter trespass," provides, in pertinent part:
Any person who uses a computer or computer network without authority and
with the intent to:
1. Temporarily or permanently remove computer data, computer programs
or computer software from a computer or computer network;
3. Alter or erase any computer data, computer programs or computer
software;
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sections also apply to computer programs. 96 Thus, these references
also should be deleted. These changes would simplify and clarify
the Act without affecting its scope. 7
The Definition of "Property"
The 1977 Virginia Supreme Court decision in Lund v. Common-
wealth," in which the court held that unauthorized use of com-
puter time and services could not constitute either grand larceny
or false pretenses under existing Virginia statutes because time
and services were not "property,"99 posed a great obstacle to suc-
cessful computer-assisted theft prosecution in Virginia. Because of
the magnitude of this problem, the General Assembly effectively
overruled Lund just one year later when it enacted Virginia's first
6. Make or cause to be made an unauthorized copy ... of computer data,
computer programs or computer software .. shall be guilty of the crime of
computer trespass....
Id. § 18.2-152.4 (emphasis added). Section 18.2-152.8, which enumerates the "property capa-
ble of embezzlement," provides, in pertinent part: "For purposes of § 18.2-111, personal
property subject to embezzlement shall include ... [flinancial instruments, computer data,
computer programs, [and] computer software .... Id. § 18.2-152.8 (emphasis added).
96. See supra note 95.
97. The complete definition of "computer program," as modified, would read:
'Computer program' means one or more related instructions or statements,
composed and structured in a form acceptable to a computer, that, when exe-
cuted by a computer in actual or modified form, cause it to perform one or
more computer operations. The term 'computer program' shall include all asso-
ciated procedures and documentation.
98. 217 Va. 688, 232 S.E.2d 745 (1977). Lund, a graduate student at Virginia Polytechnic
Institute, had been convicted of grand larceny for the theft of "keys, computer cards, com-
puter printouts and [for] using 'without authority computer operation time and services of
[the university] . . .with intent to defraud.'" Id. at 688-89, 232 S.E.2d at 746. Specifically,
Lund had been charged with larceny, VA. CODE § 18.2-100 (1950) (reenacted in 1975 as §
18.2-95), and false pretenses, VA. CODE § 18.2-118 (1950) (reenacted in 1975 as § 18.2-178).
99. 217 Va. at 691-92, 232 S.E.2d at 748. Specifically, the court held that only the "goods
and chattels of another" could be the subject of larceny, and that "goods and chattels" did
not include computer time and services. Another reason that unauthorized computer use
could not be the subject of larceny, according to the court, was that the Virginia Code also
required "a taking and carrying away of a certain concrete article of personal property." The
court also concluded that time and services could not be the subject of false pretenses at
common law because neither could be carried away. The court supported these conclusions
by noting that, although some jurisdictions had amended their criminal codes to include
time and services, Virginia had not. Id.
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computer-assisted crime statute.100 The 1978 statute stated explic-
itly that "[c]omputer time or services or data processing services or
information or data stored in connection therewith" was property
that could be the subject of larceny, embezzlement, or false
pretenses.10 1 The Virginia General Assembly repealed this statute
when it passed the Virginia Computer Crimes Act in 1984,202 but it
retained the language of the earlier statute as the definition of
"computer services, ' 1 a and it included the term "computer ser-
vices" in the definition of "property," 1°4 thus achieving the same
result.10 5
The General Assembly further broadened the Act's definition of
"property" by including within it three other classes of property
that were not the subject of larceny at common law: real prop-
erty,10 6 financial instruments, 10 7 and computer data and pro-
grams.10s In addition, the Act states that computer-related
100. Act of Apr. 8, 1978, ch. 686, 1978 Va. Acts 1120 (codified at VA. CODE § 18.2-98.1
(1982)) (repealed 1984).
101. Id.
102. Act of Apr. 11, 1984, ch. 751, § 2, 1984 Va. Acts 1759, 1763.
103. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.2 para. 6 (Supp. 1986).
104. Id. para. 11(4). The definition provides, in full:
"Property" shall include:
1. Real property;
2. Computers and computer networks;
3. Financial instruments, computer data, computer programs, computer
software and all other personal property regardless of whether they are:
a. Tangible or intangible;
b. In a format readable by humans or by a computer;
c. In transit between computers or within a computer network or between
any devices which comprise a computer; or
d. Located on any paper or in any device on which it is stored by a computer
or by a human; and
4. Computer services.
Id. para. 11.
105. See Burk, supra note 58, at 95 (asserting that the inclusion of "computer services" in
the definition of "property".was in response to Lund).
106. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.2 para. 11(1) (Supp. 1986). Real property was excluded at com-
mon law because it could not be carried away. R. PERKINS & . BoYcE, supra note 21, at 292.
Furthermore, a person who stole a real estate deed did not commit larceny at common law
because a document merged with the object it represented. Id. at 295.
107. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.2 pars. 11(3) (Supp. 1986). Negotiable notes and bills were ex-
cluded at common law. R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 21, at 295.
108. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.2 para. 11(3) (Supp. 1986). Computer data and programs were
excluded at common law because they represented intangible property-information and
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intangibles are "property" even when they are not readable by
humans, are in transit between computers, or are stored within a
computer. 10 9 Taken together, the Act's definitions of "computer
services" and "property" achieve the General Assembly's objective
by removing the obstacles to conviction created by this portion of
the decision in Lund.
Recommendations
Although the glossary in the Virginia Computer Crimes Act im-
proves upon the comparable provisions of the early proposed fed-
eral legislation and nearly every other state computer crime stat-
ute, and even though it successfully broadens the definition of
"property" to allow effective prosecution of computer-assisted
crimes, it remains unsatisfactory in two respects. First, the defini-
tion of "computer" fails to exclude devices that ordinary persons
do not consider computers and devices that cannot be used to com-
mit crimes contemplated by the Act. Second, the General Assem-
bly has not resolved the jargon problem; the Act contains unneces-
sary references to "computer software", and the definition of
"computer program" is overly technical. The Act will not become a
truly workable response to computer-assisted crime until refine-
ments along the lines of those recommended in this Note have
been made to the Act's glossary.
THE PROSCRIPTIONS IN THE VIRGINIA COMPUTER CRIMES ACT
The Virginia Computer Crimes Act proscribes a wide range of
computer-assisted activities, including unauthorized use of a com-
puter with the intent (1) to obtain property or services by false
pretenses, or to embezzle, commit larceny, or convert the property
of another;1 0 (2) to remove, alter, or erase computer data, com-
knowledge-and intangibles were not subjects of larceny at common law. R. PERKINS & R.
BOYCE, supra note 21, at 295. To illustrate, if a computer tape containing extremely valuable
information were stolen, the common law would not recognize the information contained on
the tape. The defendant could be tried only for the larceny of the physical object, and the
value of the tape itself might be so slight that only a charge of petit larceny would lie.
Accord Lund, 217 Va. at 692, 232 S.E.2d at 748. But see infra notes 135-47 and accompany-
ing text (criticizing the test of "actual value" in Lund).
109. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.2 para. 11(3)(a)-(c) (Supp. 1986).
110. Id. § 18.2-152.3.
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puter programs, or computer software from a computer;11' (3) to
cause a computer to malfunction or to cause physical injury to the
property of another;" 2 (4) to create or alter a financial instrument
or effect an electronic transfer of funds;" 3 (5) to examine any em-
ployment, salary, credit, or any other financial or personal infor-
mation relating to any other person;114 (6) to obtain computer ser-
vices;" 5 or (7) to cause physical injury to an individual." 6 The Act
also proscribes using a computer as an instrument of forgery."' In
short, the Act prohibits virtually every act of an unauthorized
computer user." 8 This section examines these prohibitions to de-
termine whether they adequately address the conduct that the
General Assembly sought to proscribe and whether they unneces-
sarily duplicate either pre-existing statutes or each other.
Computer Fraud
The first of the Act's enumerated crimes is "computer fraud,"
which prohibits unauthorized computer use with the intent to
commit the traditional property crimes of false pretenses, larceny,
embezzlement, or conversion." 9 The Commonwealth must prove
four elements to obtain a conviction for computer fraud: first, that
the defendant used a computer; second, that the defendant's use
was without authority; third, that the defendant intended to com-
111. Id. § 18.2-152.4.1, .4.3.
112. Id. § 18.2-152.4.2, .4.5.
113. Id. § 18.2-152.4.4.
114. Id. § 18.2-152.5.
115. Id. § 18.2-152.6.
116. Id. § 18.2-152.7.
117. Id. § 18.2-152.14.
118. All but one of the Act's penal sections expressly prohibit conduct only when the
perpetrator acts "without authority." See id. §§ 18.2-152.3 to .7. The phrase "without au-
thority" is unnecessary in the section forbidding use of a "computer as instrument of for-
gery," id. § 18.2-152.14, because a forger by definition acts without authority.
119. The computer fraud section provides:
Any person who uses a computer or computer network without authority
and with the intent to:
1. Obtain property or services by false pretenses;
2. Embezzle or commit larceny, or
3. Convert the property of another shall be guilty of the crime of computer
fraud....
Id. § 18.2-152.3.
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mit one of the enumerated crimes; and fourth, that the value of the
property or services the defendant obtained met the threshold
value for a felony or misdemeanor. 120 Because the Act's expanded
definition of "property"12' applies to any crime mentioned in the
Act, the Commonwealth need not prove that the property obtained
could have been the subject of false pretenses, larceny, embezzle-
ment, or conversion as those crimes are defined under Virginia
common law.
The first element of computer fraud requires proof that the de-
fendant used a computer. In proving this element, the Common-
wealth faces the definitional problems with the terms "computer"
and "use" discussed previously. 2  Further analysis of these defini-
tions is unnecessary, but the remaining elements of computer
fraud need additional examination.
The second element of computer fraud requires proof that the
defendant's use was "without authority." According to the Act, a
person uses a computer without authority "when he has no right or
permission of the owner to use a computer, or, he uses a computer
in a manner exceeding such right or permission. ' '11 3 If a prosecutor
were to attempt to prove this element without reference to the
other elements of computer fraud, that prosecutor first would have
to determine whether the owner had given the defendant the ex-
press or implied right or permission to use the computer. If so, the
prosecutor then would have to determine whether the defendant's
use had exceeded that right or permission. While the prosecutor
often would be able to carry this burden with a minimum amount
of evidence, the two-step authority inquiry could pose an insur-
mountable obstacle in some cases, especially those arising in a bus-
iness context, because many businesses do not have well-defined
rules governing employee computer use. 24
120. See id.
121. See supra note 104.
122. See supra notes 45-79 and accompanying text ("computer"); notes 83-87 and accom-
panying text ("use").
123. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.2 para. 13 (Supp. 1986).
124. Cf. Burk, supra note 58, at 96 ("As a practical matter, it is likely that the prosecu-
tion would present a minimum amount of evidence to establish absence of authority unless
the defendant were able to seriously call this evidence into doubt.").
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Fortunately, the authority element need not be analyzed in iso-
lation. A settled rule of criminal law 25 holds that "[n]o man can
authorize another to do what he may not lawfully do himself. If the
attempt to confer such authority be made, and the unlawful act be
done, both are guilty. ' 126 Under this rule, proof that the defendant
used the computer intending to commit one of the object crimes
also constitutes proof that the defendant's use was without author-
ity. A claim by the defendant that the owner authorized the use
will not relieve the defendant of criminal responsibility; it merely
will tend to indicate the owner's involvement in criminal activity.
In essence, this rule authorizes analysis of the authority element in
conjunction with the third element of computer fraud, which re-
quires the defendant to use a computer "with the intent" to obtain
property or services by false pretenses, or to commit larceny, em-
bezzlement, or conversion.127 Analyzed in this manner, the diffi-
culty associated with the authority element disappears and the fo-
cus shifts to the element of intent.
The intent element has problems of its own, stemming from the
list of crimes enumerated in the computer fraud section.1 28 By
forcing the Commonwealth to prove that the defendant used the
computer without authority with the specific intent to obtain prop-
erty or services by false pretenses, or to commit larceny, embezzle-
ment, or conversion, the statute requires the prosecutor to decide
not only which one of these crimes applies to the particular facts of
the case, but also whether the defendant intended to commit that
particular crime. Fortunately, the General Assembly has eased the
prosecutor's burden in proving the elements of the particular crime
by including in the Act the broad definition of the property that
may be the subject of the crime.129 Because of this broad defini-
tion, the crime of computer fraud encompasses unauthorized com-
125. See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 39 (1961).
126. State v. Henaghan, 73 W. Va. 706, 713, 81 S.E. 539, 542 (1914), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Bragg, 140 W. Va. 585, 87 S.E.2d 689 (1955).
127. See VA. CODE § 18.2-152.3 (Supp. 1986); supra note 119. These enumerated crimes
are defined elsewhere in the Virginia Code. See id. § 18.2-178 (1982) (false pretenses); id. §
18.2-95 (larceny); id. § 18.2-111 (embezzlement); id, § 18.2-115 (Supp. 1986) (conversion).
128. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 104.
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puter use with the intent to acquire almost any type of property,
tangible or intangible.
The final element of computer fraud hinges on the Common-
wealth's decision whether to charge the defendant with a felony or
with a misdemeanor-a decision that depends on whether the
value of the property obtained meets the $200 threshold value for
a felony. Unfortunately, the language of the threshold provision,
which terms that underlying offense a felony "[i]f the value of the
property or services obtained is $200 or more" and a misdemeanor
if "the value of the property or services obtained is less than
$200, S10 raises two serious questions. First, if the prosecutor
charges the defendant with a misdemeanor and cannot prove that
the defendant actually obtained any property or services, can the
penalty provision support the interpretation that the defendant's
unauthorized computer use constituted computer fraud? Second, if
the prosecutor charges the defendant with a felony, and the mar-
ket value of the property or services taken cannot be determined,
how should the court measure the actual value of the property or
services?
The first question arises from a possible'judicial construction of
the words "property or services obtained" in the penalty provision
of the computer fraud section."'1 A court could construe these
words as excluding defendants who fail to "obtain" any property or
services, regardless of their intent, while including defendants who
do obtain property or services, even if the property or services has
little or no value. This construction incorrectly shifts the focus of
the computer fraud section from the defendants' fraudulent con-
duct to whether they successfully accomplished the object crime.
By exonerating defendants who try to use a computer to obtain
property or services but do not succeed, this construction essen-
tially redefines computer fraud from use of a computer without au-
thority in an effort to commit the object crime to use of a com-
puter without authority actually to commit the object crime.
This "no property, no crime" interpretation ignores the "with
the intent" language of the computer fraud section. 13 2 That phrase,
130. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.3.3 (Supp. 1986).
131. Id.
132. Id.
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together with the title of the section itself, "computer fraud," evi-
dences the General Assembly's intent to proscribe the fraud com-
mitted by a person who uses a computer without authority with
the intent to commit certain crimes, and not just to reenact the
object crimes in a new form. In other words, the General Assembly
wanted to define a new crime, not to redefine existinig crimes
committed by using a computer. 13 3 Focusing on this legislative in-
tent, courts should construe the penalty provision of the computer
fraud section as including perpetrators who do not complete the
object crime because they fail to obtain the coveted property.
Courts should convict such perpetrators of misdemeanor computer
fraud.1 3 4
The second question involves the trouble courts have had in
computing the market value of computer-related intangibles such
as the contents of a computer program or data file. The Virginia
Supreme Court took a narrow-minded view of this issue in Lund,
when it rejected the Commonwealth's argument that the measure
of the value of computer printouts seized from the defendant
should be the cost of the labor and services required to produce
them.13 5 The court stated that, in the absence of evidence about a
stolen article's market value, the proper measure is the actual
value of the article. 36 Because the computer center director had
testified that the printouts were no more valuable than scrap pa-
per, the court held that the evidence of value was insufficient to
convict the defendant of grand larceny.1 37
This measure of value has little validity in a modern world. "Ac-
tual value" no longer means just the cost of materials; computer
programs and data files have little worth when so measured. The
information contained in computerized files, and the competitive
133. Accord Burk, supra note 58, at 91 (asserting that one of the General Assembly's
goals was to "treat the proscribed activities as new crimes rather than as existing crimes"
(emphasis in original)); id. at 96 (asserting that "computer fraud" is a "new [crime] not
found elsewhere in the Virginia Code").
134. An intent-based construction also would fulfill the rule of construction that, "[i]n
construing a statute, every word in it must be given its full effect, if that can be done con-
sistently." 17 MCHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE Statutes § 42, at 326 (1979).
135. 217 Va. at 692, 232 S.E.2d at 748.
136. Id. at 692-93, 232 S.E.2d at 748.
137. Id. at 693, 232 S.E.2d at 748.
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edge gained by a company that can use those files, supply the real
value. Simply put, information means money in today's society.
In a later case, Evans v. Commonwealth, 8 the Virginia Su-
preme Court hinted that it might be willing to apply an actual
value test that would better approximate the true value of
computer programs and data files. In Evans, which involved a
defendant who had taken a computer-generated "customer secur-
ity list" from his employer, the Commonwealth reduced a charge of
grand larceny to petit larceny, 1" 9 evidently because of the uncer-
tainty in calculating the market value of the list. This tactic paid
off for the Government because, although the court quoted the
"actual value" language in Lund,40 the court was able to affirm the
defendant's petit larceny conviction on the ground that petit lar-
ceny only requires proof that the article taken has some minimal
value; it does not require proof of a specific value.' Significantly,
although the court could have based its decision on the actual
value of the paper, 42 it relied instead on evidence showing that a
competitor had used the stolen list, which indicated that the com-
petitor had found the information in the list valuable, and on testi-
mony that the list was an invaluable sales tool.143 The court con-
cluded from this evidence that the list had value apart from that of
the paper. 4 4
The court's conclusion in Evans accorded with Hancock v.
Texas,145 in which the Texas Supreme Court held that a court may
consider the value of a computer program to the victim's competi-
tors and clients in determining the value of that computer program
in a theft prosecution. 46 The Virginia judiciary should apply this
test of actual value not only in a case such as Evans, but also in
any case involving the theft of computer programs, data files, or
138. 226 Va. 292, 308 S.E.2d 126 (1983).
139. Id. at 294 n.1, 308 S.E.2d at 127 n.1.
140. Id. at 297, 308 S.E.2d at 129 (quoting Lund, 217 Va. at 692, 232 S.E.2d at 748).
141. Id.
142. Although the value of the paper was mere pennies, that value would have sustained a
petit larceny conviction. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
143. 226 Va. at 297, 308 S.E.2d at 129.
144. Id. One copy of the list had been supplied to a competing bank. Id. at 295, 308
S.E.2d at 128.
145. 402 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966).
146. Id. at 909-11.
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other property valued primarily for the information it contains.
The computer fraud section then would give law enforcement offi-
cials and prosecutors a powerful weapon against computer-assisted
theft.1' 7
Computer Trespass
The single offense of "computer trespass" actually consists of us-
ing a computer without authority with the intent to cause one of
six possible results: (1) temporarily or permanently removing infor-
mation in various forms from a computer; (2) causing a computer
to malfunction; (3) altering or erasing information contained in a
computer; (4) "[effecting] the creation or alteration of a financial
instrument or of an electronic transfer of funds"; (5) "causing
physical injury to the property of another"; and (6) making an un-
authorized copy of computer data or programs.148 Because these
intended results appear to have little in common beyond the re-
quirement that the perpetrator attempt to achieve them while us-
ing a computer without authority, each must be discussed
separately.
Intent to Remove Computer Information
The first portion of the computer trespass section involves using
a computer without authority with the intent "[t]emporarily or
permanently [to] remove computer data, [or] computer programs
. ..from a computer or computer network. ' 149 Although this pro-
vision bears a striking substantive similarity to the computer fraud
section, 150 it differs in three important respects. First, this portion
of the computer trespass section relieves the Commonwealth of the
147. Another alternative would be to include a statutory test of value in the Act's glossary
that would direct the courts to determine value based on the value to the owner, any other
user of the computer, the offender, or any third party affected by the offense, whichever is
greatest. Burk, supra note 58, at 97.
148. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.4 (Supp. 1986). Computer trespass is punishable as a Class 1
misdemeanor. Id.
149. Id. § 18.2-152.4.1. All references to "computer software" are omitted throughout the
discussion of computer trespass because this jargon term should be deleted from the Act.
See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
150. Compare supra text accompanying note 149 (portion of computer trespass section)
with supra note 119 (computer fraud section).
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burden of proving either that the defendant intended to deprive
the property owner of possession permanently, as the Common-
wealth is required to do to prove computer fraud with the intent to
commit larceny or false pretenses, 5' or that the defendant
intended to misappropriate property already in the defendant's
possession, as the Commonwealth is required to do to prove com-
puter fraud with the intent to commit embezzlement or conver-
sion.152 In a prosecution under this portion of the computer tres-
pass section, the Commonwealth will meet its burden of proof if it
proves that the defendant intended to remove the property from
the computer even temporarily, 53 and the issue of whether the de-
fendant had "possession" of the property prior to removing it from
the computer will be irrelevant. Second, the prosecutor need not
prove that the property the defendant intended to acquire had
value, as probably would be required in a prosecution for computer
fraud. 54 As a result, when the prosecutor is unsure whether the
property the defendant intended to obtain had value, the better
charge is computer trespass, not computer fraud.' 55 Third, the
General Assembly limited the scope of this provision to computer-
related intangible property.' 56 The computer fraud section, on the
other hand, contains no such limitation. 57
The computer-related intangibles limitation may reflect a legis-
lative desire to relieve the Commonwealth of the burden of proving
value and permanent deprivation only when the property involved
151. For example, because the Virginia definition of "larceny" requires the "wrongful tak-
ing of personal goods of some intrinsic value, belonging to another, without his assent, and
with the intention to deprive the owner thereof permanently," Skeeter v. Commonwealth,
217 Va. 722, 725, 232 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1977) (quoting Dunleavy v. Commonwealth, 184 Va.
521, 524, 35 S.E.2d 763, 764 (1945)), a prosecutor charging computer fraud with the intent
to commit larceny, VA. CODE § 18.2-152.3.2 (Supp. 1986), must prove that the defendant had
intended to deprive the owner of possession permanently.
152. See R. PERKINS & R. BoYc., supra note 21, at 356-57.
153. See supra text accompanying note 149.
154. The better interpretation with respect to computer fraud is that the prosecutor must
prove that the defendant at least intended to obtain something of value, although the prose-
cutor need not prove that the defendant actually obtained anything of value. See supra
notes 131-134 and accompanying text.
155. This choice also avoids the issue of how to measure the value of computer-related
property, which remains uncertain in Virginia. See supra notes 135-47 and accompanying
text.
156. See supra text accompanying note 149.
157. See supra note 119.
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falls within this unique category. Within its ambit, however, this
portion of the computer trespass section provides an important
weapon against computer-assisted crime, as the first two differ-
ences between this provision and the computer fraud section
demonstrate. The relaxed burden of proof demonstrated by these
two differences evidences a legislative willingness to depart from
Virginia's conservative common law tradition regarding crimes
against property in order to provide increased protection against
crimes involving computer-related property.
Intent to Cause a Computer to Malfunction
The second portion of the computer trespass section involves un-
authorized computer use with the intent to cause a computer to
malfunction.15 This provision does not apply to physical attacks
on a computer, such as bombing or shooting it;159 the provision ap-
plies solely to using a computer with the intent to cause a com-
puter malfunction. Physical attacks on computers constitute mali-
cious mischief,1 6 0 not computer trespass.
Even situations that do fall within the scope of this computer
trespass provision often are better charged as other crimes. For ex-
ample, if an unauthorized computer user succeeds in causing a
computer malfunction, and that malfunction damages the com-
puter, the proper charge still is malicious mischief.1 61 Moreover, if
an unauthorized computer user succeeds in causing a malfunction
158. Read in conjunction with the rest of the computer trespass section, the provision
states: "Any person who uses a computer ... without authority and with the intent to...
[c]ause a computer to malfunction regardless of how long the malfunction persists ... shall
be guilty of the crime of computer trespass.. . ." VA. CODE § 18.2-152.4 (Supp. 1986).
159. See D. PARKER, supra note 13, at 18; T. WHITESIDE, supra note 12, at 4; Gemignani,
supra note 12, at 682 & n.7.
160. VA. CODE § 18.2-137 (1982) ("If any person, unlawfully, but not feloniously ... de-
stroy, deface or injure any property, real or personal, not his own ... he shall be guilty of a
Class 1 misdemeanor."). The perpetrator also might be chargeable under section 18.2-121,
which prohibits "ent[ry of] the land .. .or . . .building of another for the purpose of
damaging such property or any of the contents thereof or in any manner to interfere with
the rights of the owner, user, or the occupant thereof to use such property free from inter-
ference, id. § 18.2-121, or under section 18.2-81, which prohibits burning or destroying per-
sonal property by explosive device, id. § 18.2-81, depending on the facts of the case.
161. See 12A MicHE's JURISPRUDENCE Malicious Mischief § 3 (1978) (noting that mali-
cious mischief applies to any such injury that "impair[s] the utility or diminish[es] the value
of [the] property [affected]").
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that does not damage the computer physically, that user almost
certainly would have caused the malfunction either by erasing or
altering computer datal e2 or programming instructions,16 3 which
would be a violation of the third provision of the computer tres-
pass section.'" Consequently, the second provision of the com-
puter trespass section extends the coverage of the Virginia Code
only to the extent that it covers malfunctions that do not result in
physical damage to the computer and that are not the result of
alteration or erasure of computer data or programming instruc-
tions. Such malfunctions likely would be difficult to detect, and ev-
idence of these crimes likely would be scant. As a practical matter,
therefore, this portion of the computer trespass section should be
considered a relatively useless provision that should provide the
basis for few, if any, prosecutions.
Intent to Alter or Erase Computer Information
The third portion of the computer trespass section proscribes
unauthorized computer use "with the intent to. . .[a]lter or erase
any computer data [or] computer programs.' ' 65 The General As-
sembly apparently designed this offense to snare "hackers," com-
puter enthusiasts who use their computers to break into govern-
mental, educational, or commercial computer systems.' 6 Many of
these "computer raiders' 6 7 consider trying to outwit a computer's
security system just a game,' 8 and often boast of their accomplish-
162. The Act defines "computer data" as "any representation of information, knowledge,
facts, concepts, or instructions which is being prepared or has been prepared and is in-
tended to be processed, is being processed, or has been processed in a computer or computer
network." VA. CODE § 18.2-152.2 para. 2 (Supp. 1986).
163. "Programming instructions" are simply computer data assembled into computer-
readable instructions. One or more of these instructions make up every "computer
program." See id. para. 5 (definition of "computer program"); see also supra notes 88-92
and accompanying text (discussing how to improve the definition).
164. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
165. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.4 (Supp. 1986).
166. See, e.g., Milwaukee Discovers 'WarGamesmanship', NEwswEEK, Aug. 22, 1983, at
22.
167. Id.
168. One survey of college computer science students revealed that "34 per cent had tried
to penetrate the security of the [school's] system." 125 CONG. REC. 31,167 (1979) (quoting an
article in Canadian Business by Lydia Dotto). The survey concluded: "Many of the stu-
dents believed they weren't doing anything wrong, unless they were harming an identifiable
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ments by "publishing" the systems' passwords and access codes in
computer "bulletin boards." ' 9 This practice forces victimized
organizations to reprogram their computers with increasingly so-
phisticated and more costly security systems.
This portion of the computer trespass section, however, does not
address much of this mischief, because these hackers often do not
erase or alter data; they merely peruse information contained in
the computers' memory. These individuals commit computer inva-
sion of privacy or theft of services,'170 not computer trespass. The
third portion of the computer trespass section is aimed at a differ-
ent breed of hacker-the computer vandal who not only penetrates
the computer's security system, but also alters or erases informa-
tion contained in the computer's files' 7 -and for this purpose it
likely will be highly effective.
The Commonwealth also should consider using this provision as
a supplemental charge to computer fraud if the defendant alleg-
edly used a computer with the intent to commit larceny, embezzle-
ment, false pretenses, or conversion, or as a supplemental charge to
malicious mischief if the defendant used a computer with the in-
tent to cause a computer malfunction. These crimes are virtually
impossible to commit by computer without alteration or erasure of
some form of computer data or programming instructions. 72
Charging computer trespass in these instances gives the prosecutor
a fallback charge upon which to base a conviction.
individual. Cheating a large organization didn't seem to count." Id. The survey also revealed
"a high correlation between [computer] competence and an inclination to engage in ques-
tionable behavior-probably because of the challenge involved." Id.
169. See supra note 9.
170. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.5 (Supp. 1986) (computer invasion of privacy); id. § 18.2-152.6
(theft of services); see infra notes 206-35 and accompanying text.
171. For examples of such instances, see 130 CONG. REC. S1179 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1984)
(remarks of Sen. Cohen) (reporting actions of hackers who broke into a credit bureau com-
puter and changed records of prominent persons); Dobbins, Watch Out Roscoe, Susan
Thunder, et al.: Computer Criminals Get Caught, Baltimore Sun, June 6, 1983, at -, col.
- (reprinted in 129 CONG. REc. E2708 (daily ed. June 6, 1983)) (reporting how hackers
gained access to computerized patient records and doubled patients' medication dosages).
172. See Burk, supra note 58, at 86-87.
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Intent to Create or Alter a Financial Instrument or Electronic
Fund Transfer
The fourth portion of the computer trespass section prohibits
unauthorized computer use with the intent to create or alter a fi-
nancial instrument or to effect an electronic transfer of funds.173
This provision undoubtedly was intended to address the very real
concerns of the banking industry about computer-assisted crime. 17 4
Indeed, the impetus for drafting the Virginia Computer Crimes
Act was a request from the Virginia League of Savings Institu-
tions, 17 5 and the definition of "financial instrument" was drafted
explicitly to ensure "that automated teller machine transactions
are protected by [the] Act.' 176
The language and placement of this provision, however, is dis-
turbing. Although the attorney who drafted the initial version of
the Act has asserted that this provision is intended to proscribe
"[u]sing a computer without authority with the intent to. . . cre-
ate an improper financial instrument,' 1 7 nothing in the computer
trespass section requires fraudulent intent. The provision as writ-
ten reaches any unauthorized computer use with the intent, fraud-
ulent or otherwise, to cause any creation or alteration of a financial
instrument or electronic transfer of funds.
An Arizona case, State v. Gillies,75 illustrates conduct that the
Virginia General Assembly clearly intended to proscribe with this
provision. In Gillies, the defendant had murdered a woman and
had stolen her bank card. The defendant then had used the bank
card to obtain funds from the victim's bank account at an auto-
mated teller machine. 79 On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court
173. Read in conjunction with the rest of the computer trespass section, this provision
states: "Any person who uses a computer ... without authority and with the intent to...
[e]ffect the creation or alteration of a financial instrument or of an electronic transfer of
funds . . . shall be guilty of the crime of computer trespass .. " VA. CODE § 18.2-152.4
(Supp. 1986).
174. See, e.g., supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
175. Letter from Daniel R. Burk, initial draftsman of the Virginia Computer Crimes Act,
to Aubrey M. Davis, Jr., Commonwealth's Attorney, City of Richmond (Mar. 22, 1984) (on
file at the offices of the William and Mary Law Review).
176. Burk, supra note 58, at 95; see VA. CODE § 18.2-152.2 para. 8 (Supp. 1986).
177. Burk, supra note 58, at 97 (emphasis added).
178. 135 Ariz. 500, 662 P.2d 1007 (1983) (en banc).
179. Id. at 505, 662 P.2d at 1012.
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confirmed that an automated teller machine is part of a computer
system, and it upheld the defendant's conviction under Arizona's
comprehensive computer-assisted crime statute.180
The Virginia Computer Crimes Act, through this portion of the
computer trespass section, clearly proscribes conduct such as that
involved in Gillies, as well as any other use of a computer without
authority and with the intent to effect an improper transfer of
funds. The difficulty with the Virginia provision is that, as written,
it also proscribes unauthorized computer use with the intent to ef-
fect what would be a proper transfer of funds. For example, sup-
pose that an individual who possesses a bank card and needs
money, but who personally cannot go to the bank, gives the card
and the secret password necessary to complete the transaction to a
friend, and asks that friend to use the automatic teller machine to
withdraw money from the cardholder's savings account. If the
friend is photographed by the camera at the ATM, as was the de-
fendant in Gillies,181 and later is charged with computer trespass,
the unfortunate friend would have no effective defense. The friend
could not claim that the ATM use was authorized because, under
the terms of the usual agreement between banks and cardholders,
bank cards are the property of the bank. Consequently, the hypo-
thetical cardholder had no power to transfer the right to use the
bank card to the friend. The friend also could not avoid liability by
claiming that the transfer itself had been quite proper, unless the
court were to read an element of fraudulent intent into the provi-
sion, because the statute as written would support a conviction
merely upon evidence that the friend had received money from the
ATM that had been debited to the cardholder's account. Liability
would attach under the Virginia provision because, even though,
unlike the defendant in Gillies, the friend had acted without
fraudulent intent, the cardholder never had the power to authorize
the friend to use the ATM; the cardholder only had the power to
authorize the transfer.
One way for the General Assembly to ensure that the Act pros-
cribes the conduct in Gillies, but not the conduct hypothesized
above, would be to remove the offending provision from the com-
180. Id. at 506, 662 P.2d at 1013.
181. Id.
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puter trespass section and to enact it as a separate section, but
with an added element of fraudulent intent. This new section
would read: "Any person who uses a computer without authority,
and with fraudulent intent, to effect the creation or alteration of a
financial instrument or of an electronic transfer of funds shall be
guilty of the crime of computer trespass." The new section, in ef-
fect, would proscribe unauthorized computer use with the intent to
commit the crimes of false pretenses, embezzlement, larceny by
trick, and forgery, but it would not proscribe conduct not generally
considered wrongful.
This legislative fix, however, would have its own problems. Con-
sider the case of United States v. Jones."2 In that case, Jones'
brother, Everston, had entered information into his employer's ac-
counts payable computer data file instructing the computer to sub-
stitute Jones' name for the actual payee's name on five checks to-
taling $113,000. The computer dutifully had followed Everston's
instructions, and had issued five checks payable to Jones. Jones
subsequently had been arrested, and had been charged with trans-
porting securities in interstate commerce knowing that they were
"stolen, converted or taken by fraud."'83 The district court dis-
missed the indictment on the ground that Everston's acts consti-
tuted forgery, not false pretenses.' The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that manipulation
of computer data resulting in checks payable to the computer op-
erator's accomplice rather than to the intended payee was not for-
gery because "the alteration of supporting documents giving rise to
the issuance of a bona fide instrument amounts to the crime of
false pretenses."'185 The legislative fix proposed above would ad-
dress Everston's conduct because Everston had "[used] a computer
without authority, and with fraudulent intent, to [create] a finan-
cial instrument."' 88 The computer fraud section of the Virginia
182. 553 F.2d 351 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 968 (1977); see also S. MANDELL, supra
note 12, at 171 (discussing Jones).
183. 553 F.2d at 352 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976)).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 356. The court pointed out "a valid and recognized distinction between the
false making of a writing and the making of a false writing." Id. at 355 n.15. Everston's
crime was the former, which constitutes false pretenses, not forgery.
186. See supra text following note 182.
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Act, however, already proscribes the same conduct. 18 7 Conse-
quently, the new section would be redundant to the extent that it
proscribes false pretenses or larceny by trick. 88
The new section's coverage of computer-assisted forgery, which
usually occurs when an unauthorized computer user creates an in-
valid financial instrument that purports to be valid,'- also would
duplicate an existing provision in the Virginia Act. In this case, the
new section would not duplicate the computer fraud section; 90 in-
stead, it would duplicate a portion of the section in the Act that
addresses the "[c]omputer as an instrument of forgery."1 9' This
section states: "The creation, alteration, or deletion of any com-
puter data in any computer or computer network, which if done on
a tangible document or instrument would constitute forgery under
[the pre-existing forgery statute] will also be deemed to be for-
gery." 92 By providing broad-based coverage of computer-assisted
forgery, this provision addresses any conduct that would be ad-
dressed in the new section proposed above, but that would not be
included in the computer fraud section. 93 Consequently, instead of
creating a new statutory section based on the fourth provision of
the computer trespass section, the General Assembly should repeal
this portion of the computer trespass section in favor of the com-
puter fraud and computer as an instrument of forgery sections of
the Act.
187. See supra note 119.
188. The conviciton in Gillies, see supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text, also illus-
trates the potential redundancy. In that case, the defendant was convicted of computer
fraud in the first degree under a provision in the Arizona computer-assisted crime statute,
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2316(A) (Supp. 1986), that essentially prohibits the same conduct
Virginia prohibits in its computer fraud provision, VA. CODE § 18.2-152.3 (Supp. 1986). See
Gillies, 135 Ariz. at 506, 662 P.2d at 1013. This conduct also would be prohibited under the
proposed new statute.
189. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 21, at 414 ("Forgery is the fraudulent mak-
ing of a false writing having apparent legal significance.").
190. See supra note 119.
191. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.14 (Supp. 1986). The placement of this section, at the very end
of the Act, after the statute of limitations, venue, non-exclusivity, civil remedy, and sever-
ability sections, id. §§ 18.2-152.9 to .13, makes the provision look like an afterthought, in-
cluded to make sure that the Act covered every conceivable scenario.
192. Id. § 18.2-152.14.
193. In fact, this provision is broader than the proposed new statute because it prohibits
the use of a computer to forge any document of apparent legal significance, including instru-
ments such as wills and deeds. See id.
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Intent to Cause Physical Injury to Another's Property
The fifth portion of the computer trespass section prohibits un-
authorized use of a computer with the intent to "cause physical
injury to the property of another." 194 Like the proposed statutory
section just discussed, this provision simply restates conduct
proscribed elsewhere in the Virginia Code. For example, the intent
to injure a computer falls under the second portion of the com-
puter trespass section,' 95 the intent to injure computer data or pro-
grams falls under the third portion of the same section, 96 and the
intent to injure any tangible property falls under the Virginia mali-
cious mischief statute. 97 Because the fifth portion of the computer
trespass section adds nothing new to the law, the General Assem-
bly should repeal it.
Intent to Make Unauthorized Copies of Computer Data or
Programs
In 1985, the General Assembly amended the Virginia Computer
Crimes Act by adding a sixth provision to computer trespass sec-
tion. This provision prohibits unauthorized computer use with the
intent to make "an unauthorized copy, in any form, including, but
not limited to, any printed or electronic form of computer data,
[or] computer programs. . . residing in, communicated by or pro-
duced by a computer."'I9 The new proscription greatly improved
the Act, because neither other portions of the computer trespass
section' "99 nor the computer fraud section2 00 clearly proscribes un-
authorized computer use with the intent to copy computer data or
programs. For instance, the first portion of the computer trespass
section, which addresses unauthorized computer use with the in-
tent "[t]emporarily or permanently [to] remove" information from
the computer, 20 1 does not encompass this conduct because, in ob-
194. Id. § 18.2-152.4.5.
195. See id. § 18.2-152.4.2; supra notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
196. See id. § 18.2-152.4.3; supra notes 165-72 and accompanying text.
197. See id. § 18.2-137 (1982); supra note 160.
198. Act of Mar. 17, 1985, ch. 322, 1985 Va. Acts 398 (codified at VA. CODE § 18.2-152.4.6
(Supp. 1986)).
199. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.4 (Supp. 1986).
200. Id. § 18.2-152.3.
201. Id. § 18.2-152.4.1.
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taining copies of computer programs or files, information thieves
virtually never remove information from the computer. 2 '
Similarly, to the extent that the computer fraud section applies to
unauthorized computer use with the intent to commit larceny or
false pretenses, the computer fraud section does not proscribe this
conduct, because the crimes of larceny and false pretenses also re-
202. An information thief can copy a program without depriving the owner of possession
because of the way in which a computer operates. An operator who desires to use a particu-
lar computer program or data file first transfers the program or file from the computer's
storage device into the computer's internal memory, which consists of integrated circuitry
called "random access memory" (RAM). When this transfer occurs, the information
contained in the program or data file does not leave the storage device; the computer simply
makes a copy of the information. The operator then can view the contents of this copy by
instructing the computer to display the information on the computer screen. The operator
can modify, delete, or print this information by instructing the computer to perform the
desired task, but modifications or deletions at this point change only the copy of the pro-
gram or file located in RAM. The original program or data file in the storage device remains
unchanged. When the computer operator has finished using the program or file, the operator
instructs the computer to "save" any modifications or deletions. This instruction causes the
computer to compare the copy of the program in RAM with the original in the storage
device, and to alter the original to match the copy.
A computer operator can obtain a written copy of a program or file, without altering or
removing the original, in two ways. The first method, which is the most economical, is to
instruct the computer to print the entire program or file. This command tells the computer
to make a "formatted" copy of the program or fie, which is a copy containing special com-
mands that tell the computer printer what to print, and to send that copy to the printer.
The second method is called "screen printing," in which the operator instructs the computer
to print only the information currently being displayed on the screen. That information
represents a portion of the copy of the program or fie in RAM. Although screen printing
takes somewhat longer, a computer operator can obtain a printout of the entire program or
file by displaying it piece by piece on successive screens. Because neither of these methods
removes the original program or data file from the computer, the owner never is deprived of
possession. Consequently, an unauthorized computer operator could obtain a written copy of
a very valuable program or data file without violating the computer fraud section of the Act.
The operator would commit computer fraud only by printing a copy of the particular com-
puter program or data file and then erasing the original in the computer's storage device.
In fact, however, the "erase" command in most computers only deletes the special com-
mands that tell the computer's operating system where to find the file in storage, and not
the file itself. This feature enables a computer operator to recover the original program or
fie by using a special computer program designed to retrieve programs or files lacking the
special locator commands. An owner of one of these computers, therefore, retains possession
of a program or file even after it has been "erased," although retrieval will be difficult. In
these computers, the only sure ways to erase computer programs or data files are to write
another fie over the area of the storage device containing the "erased" information, or to
demagnetize the storage device.
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quire the offender to deprive the victim of possession of the object
of the crime.203
The new provision added to the computer trespass section in
1985, by applying specifically to the intent to make unauthorized
copies of computerized information, closes the gap in the Act. The
provision permits the Commonwealth to prosecute anyone who
uses a computer without authority with the intent to copy infor-
mation "residing in, communicated by or produced by a com-
puter. '20 4 This language ensures that the provision covers all forms
of computer copying, because the "residing in" language covers
copies made directly from a computer's memory, the "communi-
cated from" language covers copies made from information being
transferred between remotely located computers, and the "pro-
duced by" language covers copies made of the result of calculations
performed by the target computer, as well as computer printouts.
The new provision also clearly states that the crime is complete
the moment the user possesses the copy "in any form, '20 5 which
makes clear that an unauthorized computer user does not have to
reduce the copy to paper to violate the law. Through this broad
new provision, the General Assembly has given the Commonwealth
a powerful tool against information thefts.
Computer Invasion of Privacy
The Virginia Computer Crimes Act also prohibits "computer in-
vasion of privacy, ' 206 which is defined as "[intentional examina-
tion] without authority [of] any employment, salary, credit or any
other financial or personal information relating to [another] per-
203. To the extent that the computer fraud section applies to the intent to commit the
crimes of embezzlement or conversion, VA. CODE § 18.2-152.3 (Supp. 1986), the section
probably does encompass unauthorized computer use with the intent to copy programs or
data files. Misappropriating a copy of the true owner's property probably is a sufficient in-
terference with the owner's rights to meet the element of "conversion" necessary to find that
an embezzlement or conversion occurred, see R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 21, at 358,
but the determination might well depend on a factual finding as to the value of the copy to
others or the decreased value of the original to the true owner, and the issue of value re-
mains unsettled in Virginia. See supra notes 135-47 and accompanying text. As a result, the
better charge still might be the sixth portion of the computer trespass section.
204. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.4.6 (Supp. 1986).
205. Id.
206. Id. § 18.2-152.5.
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son."207 The elements of the offense are (1) use of a computer, (2)
without authority, (3) intentionally to examine (4) protected infor-
mation.208 Because this Note already has examined the first two
elements in detail,20 9 the following discussion focuses on the final
two elements.
The third element of computer invasion of privacy requires the
offender intentionally to examine certain information pertaining to
210 tanother person. Under this provision, a person "examines" pro-
tected information by reviewing it after he "knows or should know
that he is without authority" to review it. 21 This emphasis on in-
tent and guilty knowledge limits prosecution for computer invasion
of privacy to deliberate viewing of protected information. Acciden-
tal viewing does not constitute a crime.
Significantly, the crime is in the viewing itself; the offender need
not manipulate the information viewed. This feature gives the
Commonwealth a powerful weapon against hackers, who frequently
are accused of perusing private information, especially credit
records. 1 2 The Act now properly proscribes this conduct as an un-
warranted invasion of privacy.
207. Id. The computer invasion of privacy section reads, in full:
A. A person is guilty of the crime of computer invasion of privacy when he
uses a computer or computer network and intentionally examines without au-
thority any employment, salary, credit or any other financial or personal infor-
mation relating to any other person. "Examination" under this section requires
the offender to review the information relating to any other person after the
time at which the offender knows or should know that he is without authority
to view the information displayed.
B. The crime of computer invasion of privacy shall be punishable as a Class
3 misdemeanor.
Id.
208. See id.
209. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text ("use"); supra notes 45-79 and accom-
panying text ("computer"); supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text ("without
authority").
210. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.5 (Supp. 1986). For purposes of the Virginia Computer Crimes
Act, "person" includes not only individuals, but also any "partnership, association, corpora-
tion or joint venture." Id. § 18.2-152.2 para. 10.
211. Id. § 18.2-152.5.
212. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REc. S1179 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Cohen)
(noting instance in which hackers broke into a credit bureau computer and changed records
of prominent persons).
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The fourth element of computer invasion of privacy, the concept
of protected information, probably evolved from the public's sensi-
tivity to the "big brother" aspect of computers and their impact on
privacy.2 13 The General Assembly addressed this concern by out-
lining, in broad terms, the types of information expected to receive
protection: "employment, salary, credit or any other financial or
personal information relating to any other person. '214 This sweep-
ing language provides expansive protection to computer owners
and the subjects of their files, because it causes the statute to cover
the intentional, unauthorized examination not only of computer-
ized employment, credit, pay, and financial records, but also of the
information contained in files such as medical histories and school
transcripts. In fact, given the public's sensitivity to invasion of pri-
vacy by computer and the legislature's expansive response to that
concern, the courts arguably should interpret this provision as en-
compassing any computerized information concerning a person
that is not a matter of public record.
Theft of Computer Services
The Act also prohibits theft of computer services. It states: "Any
person who willfully uses a computer or computer network, with
intent to obtain computer services without authority, shall be
guilty of the crime of theft of computer services .... ,"216 Because
this provision explicitly requires "willful" use, it is far superior to
the early federal proposals 16 and the state statutes based upon
them.21 7 This willfulness requirement prevents the Commonwealth
from prosecuting an alleged offender for "mere" unauthorized
computer use.
Commentators criticized the early federal legislative proposals
because they would have punished virtually every intentional, un-
213. The interrelationship between computers and protection of privacy is beyond the
scope of this Note. For further information, see S. MANDELL, supra note 12, at 171-91; D.
PARKER, supra note 13, at 237-65.
214. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.5 (Supp. 1986).
215. Id. § 18.2-152.6.
216. See S. 240, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 1190 (1979); S. 1766, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 21,025 (1977).
217. See supra note 31.
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authorized use of a computer,"' regardless of the offender's mo-
tive. These commentators charged that the proposals were over-
broad because they failed "to distinguish between felonious uses of
computers, lesser criminal uses of computers, and ethically ques-
tionable or simple unauthorized uses."2 19 They explained that pro-
grammers commonly use their employers' computers for relatively
innocent activities such as playing games and drawing calendars,220
writing "unauthorized" computer programs, 2 ' and performing mi-
nor personal tasks such as balancing checkbooks, charting stocks,
and figuring mortgages.2 Although these activities are relatively
harmless, and employers' attitudes toward them vary widely,223 an
errant computer programmer could have been fined up to $50,000
and sentenced to up to fifteen years in jail under the initial federal
proposal.224 The result, as one commentator noted, would have
been "a sanction totally out of proportion to the 'offense.' -1225 This
commentator concluded that "[e]mployment sanctions have been,
and should continue to be, the adequate and proper remedy"2 26 for
such activities.
The Virginia Computer Crimes Act essentially adopts this posi-
tion by requiring the offender "willfully [to use] the computer...
to obtain computer services without authority. '227 "[W]hen used in
218. See S. 240, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 1190 (1979) (proposed 18. U.S.C. §
1028(a)); S. 1766, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 21,025 (1977) (proposed 18 U.S.C. §
1028(a)).
219. Taber, supra note 12, at 530.
220. Id.; Gemignani, supra note 12, at 709-10.
221. Taber, supra note 12, at 530.
222. Id.; see also Gemignani, supra note 12, at 710 (postulating the use of a company
computer to compile bowling league statistics).
223. One commentator noted: "Some [employers] flatly forbid [computer use for personal
activities]. Others forbid the practice in theory, but allow it in practice, and even 'wink' at
it. Still others permit it as a fringe benefit of employment. For many companies, such use
has never been considered a 'problem' that needed to be addressed." Taber, supra note 12,
at 531 (footnotes omitted).
224. S. 1766, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 21,025 (1977) (proposed 18 U.S.C. §
1028(a)). The computer-assisted crime proposal introduced in the next Congress provided
for the same prison term, but changed the fine to "a sum not more than two and one-half
times the amount of the fraud or theft." S. 240, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 1190
(1979) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)).
225. Taber, supra note 12, at 530-31.
226. Id. at 531.
227. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.6 (Supp. 1986).
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a criminal statute [the word "willfully"] generally means an act
done with a bad purpose .. "228 Applying this definition to the
Virginia Act, the computer user not only must use the computer
without authority, but also must use it with a bad purpose. If an
employee uses the company computer for playing games, believing
incorrectly that the employer has authorized it, that employee can-
not be convicted of computer theft of services in Virginia. Even
though the employee's game playing was intentional and unautho-
rized, the employee did not act with a bad purpose. The em-
ployee's use was not willful, and therefore it was not illegal.
Prosecutors might argue that this "willful use" requirement
places a heavy burden on them because it requires proof of the
accused's state of mind at the time of the unauthorized computer
use. Although this argument has some merit, the "willful use" re-
quirement should ease the prosecutors' task in the long run, be-
cause it encourages employers to promulgate useful guidelines for
employee computer use so that employees accused of unauthorized
computer use could not argue that their unauthorized use had
been without knowledge of any illegality. Prosecutors will have lit-
tle difficulty proving their cases if employers publish such guide-
lines and require every employee to read and abide by them.229
Widespread adoption of these guidelines also would yield several
other benefits: first, employers would have better control of per-
sonal computer use by employees; second, computer operators and
programmers would work in an atmosphere free from uncertainty
concerning personal computer use; third, employee awareness of
the criminal penalties for computer theft of services likely would
reduce the incidence of such theft; and fourth, the conviction rate
for computer theft of services probably would be high, thus deter-
ring others from engaging in this undesired conduct.
One problem area that would not be addressed by employee
computer use guidelines would be theft of services by hackers. Al-
though proving that a hacker who broke into another's computer
obtained services "without authority" would be a simple matter
because these break-ins always are without authority, proving
228. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933); see also R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE,
supra note 21, at 875-79 (discussing wilfullness).
229. See Burk, supra note 58, at 92.
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"willful" use would be another matter. Hackers often claim that
they were simply "joyriding";2 30 in other words, they claim that
they were acting on a lark, and not with a bad purpose. This claim
would have no force if constructive notice of this provision were
sufficient to make the hacker's act "willful" but, in cases involving
hackers, the Commonwealth might have to prove actual notice of
the provision to meet the element of "willfulness." It might be the
only way to show a bad purpose.231
The Commonwealth possibly could avoid the difficulty of prov-
ing actual notice by charging hackers with computer fraud, 32 on
the theory that they obtained property233 by false pretenses, with
the fraud being the hackers' misrepresentation of their authority
to use the computer.234 A prosecution for computer fraud, however,
should be reserved for more serious crimes. A better long-term so-
lution would be for "educational institutions to begin teaching
computer ethics along with computer competency, so that young-
sters who sit down at a computer keyboard will understand the
difference between a game and a crime. ' 235 The Commonwealth
can apply the computer theft of services provision to hackers most
effectively only when these individuals realize the consequences of
their actions.
Personal Trespass by Computer
The final penal section of the Act, "personal trespass by com-
puter," prohibits unauthorized use of a computer with the intent
230. 130 CONG. REC. S1179 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Cohen).
231. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 119.
233. "Property," for purposes of the Act, includes computer services. VA. CODE § 18.2-
152.2 para. 11 (Supp. 1986); supra note 104. Although the computer fraud provision also
covers unauthorized computer use with the intent to obtain "services," see supra note 119,
the General Assembly undoubtedly meant the word "services" in that context to refer only
to "traditional" services such as "labor, professional services, transportation, telephone or
other public services, accommodation in motels, hotels, restaurants or elsewhere, [and] ad-
mission to exhibitions." See ALA. CODE § 13A-8-10 (1982) (listing these services in a similar
provision). This construction ensures that the word "services" in the computer fraud provi-
sion has a meaning independent of the word "property." See supra note 134.
234. This course of action also is open to the Commonwealth with respect to any other
type of computer theft of services.
235. 130 CONG. REc. E634 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Wyden).
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to cause physical injury to an individual.236 Although the General
Assembly labeled this crime a "trespass," courts should ignore this
characterization because the language of the provision describes an
assault.237 The provision does not require actual injury; it requires
only the intent to injure.
Because the Virginia Code already contains a section prohibiting
simple assaults, 8 one could argue that the personal trespass sec-
tion is redundant, and therefore unnecessary. This argument
would be erroneous. Unlike the simple assault provision, which
would not be applied in a prosecution for conduct that actually
produced physical injury,39 the personal trespass by computer sec-
tion applies equally to conduct that produces injury and conduct
that does not. As a result, while the usual assault becomes a felony
when it produces injury, making it malicious wounding or unlawful
wounding240 rather than a simple assault, a personal trespass by
computer becomes a felony, regardless of whether physical injury
results, when the act is committed "maliciously" rather than
merely "unlawfully. '24 1 This statutory scheme leads to some curi-
ous results. If an offender maliciously assaulted another individual
in a face-to-face encounter, for example, the offender's crime
would be the misdemeanor of simple assault, assuming that no
236. VA. CODE § 18.2-152.7 (Supp. 1986). The section provides, in full:
A. A person is guilty of the crime of personal trespass by computer when he
uses a computer or computer network without authority and with the intent to
cause physical injury to an individual.
B. If committed maliciously, the crime of personal trespass by computer
shall be punishable as a Class 3 felony. If such act be done unlawfully but not
maliciously, the crime of personal trespass by computer shall be punishable as
a Class 1 misdemeanor.
Id.
237. See 2A MxHIm'S JURISPRUDENCE Assault & Battery §§ 2, 4 (1981).
238. VA. CODE § 18.2-57 (1982).
239. Conduct that actually produced physical injury would be malicious wounding, a
Class 3 felony, or unlawful wounding, a Class 6 felony. Id. § 18.2-51. The Virginia Code does
indicate that "assault and battery" is a lesser included offense of "malicious wounding," id.
§ 18.2-54, but the case law concerning the malicious wounding statute indicates that the
lesser offense would be simple assault and battery, Spradlin v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 523,
524, 79 S.E.2d 443, 444 (1954); Crutchfield v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 291, 293, 46 S.E.2d
340, 341 (1948); Williams v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 987, 992, 151 S.E. 151, 153 (1930),
which is only a misdemeanor, VA. CODE § 18.2-57 (1982).
240. See VA. CODE § 18.2-51 (1982).
241. Id. § 18.2-152.7 (Supp. 1986).
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physical injury resulted, while the same crime committed with the
assistance of a computer would be a felony. Although the General
Assembly may not have intended this anomalous result, the dis-
tinction remains, and provides a justification for viewing the provi-
sion as distinguishable from simple assault under other provisions
of the Virginia Code.
CONCLUSION
The revolution that has swept the computer to preeminence has
carried with it a parasite-the computer-assisted crime. Computer-
assisted crimes typically are just old crimes dressed in new clothes,
but the law has seemed unable to cope with the unique problems
these crimes present. Some computer-assisted crimes-heists in-
volving millions-have caught the public's eye, causing law en-
forcement officials and legislators to react or, perhaps more accu-
rately, to overreact to perceived inadequacies in state and federal
penal codes.
The experience in Virginia illustrates well the legislative ten-
dency to overreact to the specter of computer-assisted crime. Even
though the General Assembly arguably had solved its statutory
problems when it passed its first computer-assisted crime statute
in 1978, it repealed that statute and replaced it with a comprehen-
sive Act intended to "cover all the bases." In the process, the Gen-
eral Assembly enacted redundant provisions and unnecessarily du-
plicated existing crimes.
To streamline the Act, the General Assembly should consider
deleting provisions two, four, and five of the computer trespass
section, and also should simplify and clarify the Act by removing
every reference to "computer software" and by putting the defini-
tion of "computer program" into more understandable terms. Most
importantly, the General Assembly should redefine the Act's vague
definition of "computer." The Virginia Computer Crimes Act will
not become a truly effective tool for suppressing computer-assisted
crime until the General Assembly modifies it to correct its signifi-
cant shortcomings.
ROBIN K. KUTZ
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